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The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXIX, No. 742 • PUBLICATION 5188

September 14, 1953

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952).

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Korean Problems

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

The Korean war began in a way in which wars often begin—a potential aggressor miscalculated. From that we learn a lesson which we expect to apply in the interests of future peace. The lesson is this: If events are likely which will in fact lead us to fight, let us make clear our intention in advance; then we shall probably not have to fight.

Big wars usually come about by mistake, not by design. Aggressive despots think that they can make a grab unopposed, or opposed but feebly. So, they grab. And to their surprise they find themselves involved in unexpected opposition which means major war.

Many believe that neither the First World War nor the Second World War would have occurred if the aggressor had known what the United States would do. It is even more probable that the Korean war would not have occurred if the aggressor had known what the United States would do. The Communists thought, and had reason to think, that they would not be opposed except by the then small and ill-equipped forces of the Republic of Korea. They did not expect what actually happened.

There is in this a profound lesson. All the peoples of the world passionately want peace. But too often they think that peace is won merely by pacifism. They should know by now that peace is not had merely by wanting it, or talking about it, or seeming to accept the role of a door-mat. To win peace is as hard, if not harder, than to win a war. To achieve peace is a science. Indeed, it is a most difficult, sometimes a rugged science.

Peace requires anticipating what it is that tempts an aggressor and letting him know in advance that, if he does not exercise self-control, he may face a hard fight, perhaps a losing fight.

The Korean war—the third such war in our generation—should finally have taught us that, if we can foresee aggression which will cause us to fight, we should let this be known, so that the potential aggressor will take this into his calculations.

¹ Made before the American Legion at St. Louis, Mo., on Sept. 2 (press release 469 dated Sept. 1). Also available as Department of State publication 5190.

This administration intends to act realistically to win the battle for peace.

Aggressors Repelled

Since there was a war in Korea, it was vital that the outcome should justify the sacrifice made. It was important to establish the fact that aggressors, hostile to the free world, cannot go on enlarging themselves by the conquest of small nations until they become bloated with power and dizzy with "success." This fact has been established in Korea.

The aggressor, which initially overran all of Korea except a small beachhead at Pusan, has been thrown back to and beyond his point of beginning. He now controls 1,500 fewer square miles than when he started and has incurred casualties totaling about 2,000,000. The cost to the aggressor has been colossal. His gains have been nil.

Some persons seem to feel that our men who fought in Korea fought uselessly. That is a cruel misjudgment of the situation. Those who rolled back the military aggression in Korea checked forces, which, if unchecked, would have gone on to imperil the United States. They showed a discipline, a courage, a competency, on the land, in the air, and on the sea, which has gained the respect of the whole world, including our enemies. Because of what they did, we today live more safely. Our armed services wrote in Korea another epic chapter of glorious service for the Nation. For that, the American people must be forever grateful.

Political Asylum for Prisoners of War

The terms of the Korean Armistice² also established another principle of great importance to us: the right of enemy prisoners to enjoy political asylum. Let me explain why this principle is so important.

The Soviet leaders fear that, if they were to launch a major war of aggression, many of their soldiers and airmen would seize the opportunity

² BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1953, p. 132.

to desert or to allow themselves readily to be made prisoners. Such desertions are occurring even now. Therefore, the Soviet leaders hoped that the Korean Armistice would establish a principle which would discourage future defections and thus make their Red Armies more dependable. They demanded, in Korea, that any who deserted or who were made prisoners and who espoused the cause of freedom must be forcibly returned to where they could be punished for their defection.

In Europe, after the end of World War II, many who were claimed by the Soviets were forcibly returned, except as some elected suicide as a preferable fate. The Communists wanted the Korean Armistice to elevate that practice into generally accepted international law. We refused.

This time, no Red Army prisoners who want freedom will be sent back to captivity. A new and healthy principle has been established. As a result, from now on, the Red Armies will be less dependable as tools of aggression. So in this way, too, we have increased the prospect of peace and added to the security of our nation.

Treatment of Convicted Prisoners

Today we can also report that it seems that none of our prisoners of war will be held back because of alleged offenses. When I was in Freedom Village last month, meeting returning prisoners, there were reports that the Communists intended to require a number of our men to serve prison sentences. The Communist official radio was declaring that the Geneva Convention gave them this right.

I at once made a public statement to the effect that the armistice agreement required the return of "all" prisoners who wanted to be returned and that, to us, "all" means "all."³ I further stated that we would hold Communist prisoners of war against whom charges were pending until we knew what the Communists were going to do.

We have now received word from General [Mark W.] Clark that the Military Armistice Commission,⁴ representing the two sides, has agreed that all captured personnel who desire repatriation shall be returned without regard to alleged offenses. This is good news. We on our side shall, of course, conform to this understanding.

Deterrents to New Aggression

We can all take satisfaction in the fact that President Eisenhower has found it possible to stop the fighting on honorable terms. Now, we turn to the political aspects of the problem.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 235.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 3, 1953, p. 134.

I headed a delegation that went to Korea last month to discuss these matters with President Syngman Rhee.⁵ We acted with a background of regular consultation with congressional leaders, both Democrat and Republican. The Republic of Korea and our delegation then agreed on the terms of a security treaty.⁶ It will not, of course, be effective until the Senate gives its consent.

This proposed treaty is another step in the development of a Pacific security system. The treaty would complement the earlier treaties which I negotiated in 1951 with the Philippines,⁷ Australia, New Zealand⁸ and Japan.⁹ Also, the Korean treaty would prevent any recurrence of the enemy miscalculation of 1950 which brought about the Korean war. The proposed new security treaty will constitute a clear warning. It will make it unlikely that the Republic of Korea will be subjected to another act of unprovoked military aggression which would again involve the United States.

As another deterrent to renewed aggression, the United States and the other 15 members of the United Nations which fought aggression in Korea issued a declaration¹⁰ that, if the armistice should be breached by unprovoked Communist aggression, then the 16 nations would "again be united and prompt to resist." Also, that declaration points out that "the consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

Since 1950, the forces of aggression have been supplied, equipped, and protected by air, from unmolested bases in China, just north of the Yalu. If, however, the Communists desire to resume the war, they now know that they could no longer count on this "privileged sanctuary."

The Korean Political Conference

We are now making plans for a political conference which, we hope, will turn the armistice into permanent peace.

There have been some differences of opinion as to the composition of the conference. Some, for example, favored the inclusion of India. These matters were debated and resolved at the meeting of the United Nations Assembly which concluded last week.¹¹

⁵ For joint statement by Secretary Dulles and President Rhee on their consultations, see *ibid.*, Aug. 17, 1953, p. 203.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 17, 1953, p. 204.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1951, p. 335.

⁸ For text of Tripartite Security Treaty signed by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1951, p. 148.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247.

¹¹ See p. 361.

The United States opposed the inclusion of India in the Korean conference. We did so reluctantly but for two reasons that seemed controlling. The Korean armistice agreement called for a conference of the two "sides" and India did not fit into either side. India was not identified with the Communist side, and it had preferred not to join with the forces fighting aggression in Korea. That abstention was India's privilege. But like most privileges it cost a price. One price was profound distrust on the part of the Republic of Korea. When in Korea last month, we realized the full intensity and depth of this distrust. That provided the second reason why we opposed the inclusion of India.

Korea is the primary subject of the political conference. Seventy-five percent of all Koreans are under, and loyal to, the Republic of Korea. They have shown an intensity of anti-Communist dedication and a willingness to sacrifice which has few, if any, historic parallels. Their attitude cannot prudently be ignored.

The United Nations has been inclined to debate Korean matters without paying much attention to the Republic of Korea. Some of the member states seem to have assumed that the Republic of Korea would automatically go along with anything that the United Nations wanted. In fact, the Republic of Korea is not a puppet. It has a will of its own, and 20 million people have backed that will with enormous sacrifices. The Korean question cannot be settled without the Republic of Korea. We felt that the United Nations should give the political conference its maximum chance to succeed. So the United States voted against extending an invitation to India. In doing so, we had the support of good friends. Also we regretfully split votes with some other good friends. In the end, India graciously withdrew.

Our action involved no reflection upon India. This administration has great respect for India, and we seek friendship with India. We have already shown that in unmistakable ways, and we intend to go on showing it.

But the forthcoming conference is a serious business. It is a prolongation of the struggle in which over 25,000 Americans laid down their lives and in which nearly 125,000 more became casualties. We owe it to these Americans to be as disciplined in our political thinking as they were disciplined in the cause of liberty.

A Conference With a Terminal Point

We have come to another conclusion regarding the postarmistice conference. We shall not sit in it indefinitely.

There is a long record of Communist negotiations which have been dragged out merely in order to give the Communists a cover for achieving ulterior purposes.

September 14, 1953

Negotiators seeking an Austrian peace treaty have met 374 times since 1946—and last week the Soviets announced that they called the whole thing off.

In 1951, the Deputies of the so-called "Big Four" Foreign Ministers spent 109 days in Paris talking repetitiously and futilely about an agenda for a proposed Big Four meeting on Germany, a meeting that was never held.

The Korean armistice negotiations, begun in June 1951, were for many months prolonged as a cover for a Communist military build-up and, by the first of this year, they had lapsed into nothingness.

We shall not repeat such performances. We are always ready to negotiate in good faith. But we expect good faith to be mutual. We shall not lend ourselves to Communist maneuvers designed to win their ends through guile.

So, if the Korean conference discusses Korea for 3 months without making genuine progress toward the settlement of the Korean business, we shall pause to take stock of the situation. We shall consult with the Republic of Korea and with our other friends. If, as a result of these consultations, we conclude that the conference is serving no useful purpose, we shall expect to withdraw from the conference. We believe that, in negotiating with the Communists, we should always have in mind a terminal point.

The Chance of Political Success

It would, of course, be foolish to attempt to forecast what the result of the Korean political conference will be. It ought to succeed; but that is not to say that it will succeed. The United States, at least, has no secret or ulterior purposes. We seek no pretext for turning Korea into a United States base on the Asia mainland. We seek only the long-proclaimed goal of the United Nations, namely, the peaceful unification of Korea under a representative form of government. We stand for "a united Korea for free Koreans." On details, our thinking is flexible. We hope that the Communists will come to the conference in the same spirit and not throw roadblocks in the way of achieving a simple and fair result in the interest of the long-suffering Korean people.

The War in Indochina

We do not make the mistake of treating Korea as an isolated affair. The Korean war forms one part of the worldwide effort of communism to conquer freedom. More immediately it is part of that effort in Asia.

A single Chinese-Communist aggressive front extends from Korea on the north to Indochina in

the south. The armistice in Korea, even if it leads to a political settlement in Korea, does not end United States concern in the western Pacific area. As President Eisenhower said in his April 16 speech,¹² a Korean armistice would be a fraud if it merely released Communist forces for attack elsewhere.

In Indochina a desperate struggle is in its eighth year. The outcome affects our own vital interests in the western Pacific, and we are already contributing largely in material and money to the combined efforts of the French and of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

We Americans have too little appreciated the magnitude of the effort and sacrifices which France has made in defense of an area which is no longer a French colony but where complete independence is now in the making. This independence program is along lines which the United States has encouraged and justifies increased United States aid, provided that will assure an effort there that is vigorous and decisive.

Communist China has been and now is training, equipping, and supplying the Communist forces in Indochina. There is the risk that, as in Korea, Red China might send its own army into Indochina. The Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina. I say this soberly in the interest of peace and in the hope of preventing another aggressor miscalculation.

We want peace in Indochina, as well as in Korea. The political conference about to be held relates in the first instance to Korea. But growing out of that conference could come, if Red China wants it, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The United States would welcome such a development.

The American Tradition

These international tasks are, as you can see, complicated. However, one simple sentiment dominates all that we do. We seek to promote the welfare of the United States.

We are not indifferent to the welfare of other people, and oftentimes our own welfare is tied into that of others. We know that any individual who tries to live a wholly selfish life is an unhappy outcast. That is equally true of nations. But the basic motive which animates those of us who work for your Government is the same motive that animated you legionnaires when you fought for your country—that is, a patriotic dedication.

This nation was founded by men who were intensely patriotic, but there was nothing narrowly

selfish about their patriotism. They were men of vision, who saw for our nation a great destiny. Always they showed what our Declaration of Independence calls "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Always they were understanding of the wants of others and generous in efforts to fulfill them. Always they sought that our national purposes should conform to the principles of moral law, which have universal application. In their international relations they were not arrogant or inflexible. They always believed in international cooperation and accepted the principle of interdependence. Indeed our earliest foreign policy, which bears the name of President Monroe, affirmed the solidarity of the nations of this Western Hemisphere. The faith which led the American people to lead in organizing the United Nations was no aberration, but the same kind of faith which has animated our people since the earliest days. The United Nations as the "town meeting of the world" is the realization of an early American concept. We welcome it, because we know that our own international purposes can afford exposure to the light of day.

There is much talk these days about the increased responsibility that now devolves upon the United States. That responsibility is a reality. And we need not shrink from it out of fear that it requires the scrapping of our American traditions and ideals. It does not mean that we now have to be constantly taking international public-opinion polls and then doing what it seems will make us popular with others. Popularity won in that way is shabby and fleeting.

For more than a century the United States has enjoyed worldwide respect and prestige. That kind of respect is worth having. I hope that we shall continue to win it in the only way it can be won, which is the way of our forefathers. That is the American way. It is the way we expect to follow.

Restoration of Peace in Indochina

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 475 dated September 3

Asked at his press conference on September 3 whether his St. Louis speech was subject to conflicting interpretation as to whether the United States was willing to include the question of a possible restoration of peace in Indochina at the Korean political conference, Secretary Dulles made the following reply:

I do not think that I ever said that these political talks would necessarily be limited exclusively to Korea. We have said that the con-

¹² *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 601.

ference as originally set up, in our opinion, should be limited to Korea. But also I think I have made clear that, if matters at that conference go well and the Chinese Communists show a disposition to settle in a reasonable way such a question as Indochina, we would not just on technical grounds say, "No, we won't talk about that."

Of course, any discussions which dealt with Indochina would have to have a different participation than the conference which dealt with Korea. For example, the Republic of Korea is an indispensable party to a conference such as is projected about Korea. But Korea would not be an indispensable party to discussions about Indochina. So that in effect it would not be the same conference. Certainly in any discussion about Indochina, for example, the three Associated States of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia would be necessary parties. They are not parties to the Korean conference. What we mean is that if the atmosphere, insofar as it may be contributed to by Communist China, seemed to be conducive for the settlement of the Indochina war, we would not be opposed to that.

Revision of U. N. Charter

*Press Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles*¹

Press release 474 dated September 3

The purpose of that speech was primarily to stimulate thinking by such bodies as the American Bar Association on this whole topic. I think that the forthcoming conference, which I assume will be held at or about 1955, roughly 2 years from now, can be a conference of very great importance.

Those of us who were at San Francisco are vividly aware of the fact that many of the provisions of the charter were adopted with very considerable reservation on the part of many countries. They were adopted and accepted with the very definite understanding that this was going to be a 10-year trial period, and at the end of that 10 years the situation would be looked over in the light of actual experience.

I believe there are a number of respects in which the charter can be improved, but at the moment I am not prepared to take an official position indicating what the final view of the United States Government will be. We believe that this is a subject which ought to be studied well in advance, and that the study should not merely be Governmental, which we are to some extent now carrying on. That study, in our view, should also be con-

ducted by private bodies—educational bodies, religious bodies, bar associations, and the like—all should be studying this problem.

In the United States in 1945 a very considerable influence was exerted on the San Francisco conference by private organizations. I myself, preceding that conference, was chairman of a church commission called the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace. We exerted a very considerable influence on the San Francisco conference, and I believe that bodies like that ought to be alerted to the opportunity which presumably will now lie before them.

I think that should be the case, not only in the United States but in other countries as well. You will recall that in April of 1945, when the San Francisco conference was convened, the war was still on, not only in the Pacific but also in Europe. War conditions prevailed in much of the world. The result was that the San Francisco conference was held under conditions where there was very little opportunity for many of the peoples of the world to exert much influence upon what was done. The United States was in a unique position in that respect because the conference was held here and our Nation was less disturbed by war conditions than many of the others.

This next review conference when it comes about, as I hope it will, should be an occasion for the bringing to bear upon the thinking and decision of that conference the views of intelligent, thoughtful people, not only in the United States but in all the countries of the world. I would hope very much that throughout the world, organizations which represent the aspirations of their people should make themselves felt.

The Preamble of the charter, you may recall, purports to speak in terms of the peoples. It starts out, "We the peoples." But in the main we had to guess what the people wanted because they did not really have an opportunity adequately to express their views, except, perhaps, from the United States. In my Boston speech I raised this question primarily to stimulate thinking, for activity needs to be gotten under way promptly.

The United States Senate, as you know, passed a resolution to establish a special Senate Committee to explore this question and to make recommendations concerning it.² The Netherlands Government, quite independently of any suggestion from us and before my Boston speech, put an agenda item on this subject for discussion at the session of the General Assembly which will be convened on September 15. My purpose is merely to join with others in arousing public attention to the fact that this great opportunity is coming along and the hope that people will take advantage of it.

¹ Made in reply to a request for elaboration on his address before the American Bar Association at Boston, Mass., on Aug. 25, (BULLETIN of Sept. 7, 1953, p. 307) concerning possible revision of the U.N. Charter.

² For correspondence between the Secretary and Senator Wiley concerning this resolution, see BULLETIN of Sept. 7, 1953, p. 310.

Individual Liberty and the National Security

by Thruston B. Morton

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations¹

David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, once said that "hope is the mainspring of patriotism."

Lloyd George may have overstated the case just a little. But it is certainly true that there can be no genuine patriotism without hope. For hope is closely related to confidence—to confidence in your country, your way of life, your traditions. The fears and frustrations of this difficult world are such that only the true patriot can hold on to his hopes and his convictions. Only the true patriot has enough confidence in the American democracy to know that that democracy can surmount the most difficult of international problems.

Only the true patriot can tell the difference between those things that really threaten our democracy and those other things which the fanatic and fearful say are threats. There is a difference—a big difference. AMVETS has demonstrated that it knows what the difference is.

You know the difference because you understand the meaning of liberty. You have proved your understanding by your willingness to fight for liberty on the battlefield. You have also proved it by the forthright stand you have taken on public issues and by the record you have written since your beginnings at the close of World War II.

I have read that record. It shows that young people are not necessarily immature people. It testifies to your knowledge as to what is at stake for America in a world threatened by Communist power. It shows that AMVETS has not allowed itself to be stampeded because some of our major foreign-policy problems have not been solved overnight. It shows that you believe in America and in America's staying power. It shows that you had foresight.

Several years ago AMVETS went on record in support of a mutual defense pact in the Pacific. Today, America has become party to several such pacts with our key Pacific neighbors.

¹ Address made before the AMVETS national convention at Indianapolis, Ind., on Sept. 3 (press release 465 dated Aug. 28).

You have gone on record against the forced repatriation of war prisoners in Korea. America has stood firm against such forceful repatriation.

You have continually expressed your support of and confidence in the United Nations and of a policy dedicated to unity between America and her allies.

That support and confidence in the United Nations have been vindicated in Korea. And America has stood side by side with her allies despite the pressures of international communism, the tensions which would beset any alliance in a complex world, and the complaints of those relatively few Americans who refuse to support the United Nations.

You have urged that neither Japan nor Formosa be allowed to fall victim to Communist aggression. Your Government has taken economic, political and military aid measures aimed at insuring the security of these vital areas of the Far East.

You have steadily urged that the United States use every reasonable means to secure the release of William Oatis from a Czech Communist prison. Today—after many long and bitter months of confinement—newspaperman Oatis is a free man.

These, then, are some of the stands you have taken on vital foreign-policy issues. They are part of a record, a record which has been tested and proved by experience.

That record shows that you have never faltered in your belief in your country. You have held on to your hopes.

You have recognized the menace of the global Communist conspiracy. But you have also recognized America's responsibilities to the free world.

Most important of all, you have understood the need for sacrifice when our liberty and security were threatened—even as they were threatened by the Communist aggression in Korea.

Today, in particular, it is of the greatest importance that every American understand clearly what has been at stake in Korea and what has been accomplished there. So today, I would like to take a close look at Korea. I would like to do a little summing up.

Summing Up the Korean Experience

I think it important to relate what is happening in Korea today to our reasons for going into Korea in the first place. Such an assessment is particularly important at this time in light of the charges that some people have been making to the effect that America has been defeated in Korea. This is a free country. These people are entitled to their opinion. But that opinion does not square with the facts.

Further, it is rather shocking to discover that the "American-defeat-in-Korea" line is exactly that taken by Georgi Malenkov, premier of the Soviet Union, in his very important speech of August 8.

The Communist line on Korea—as laid down by Malenkov—is that Korea was a defeat for America and a major Communist victory. Malenkov said that the United Nations had "miscalculated" in Korea. And he repeated the old charge that we Americans are to blame for the aggression there.

I repeat: The "defeat-for-America" theme parallels the Communist line. And, like most Communist lines, it is entirely false.

What, then, are the facts about Korea?

In the first place, we went into Korea to halt the Communist aggression there. We went in because we realized that if the Communists got away with the assault in Korea, the entire structure of the United Nations and of the free-world defense system would crumble. We fought in Korea so that we would not have to fight in Cleveland, in Los Angeles and yes—in Indianapolis. It is that simple.

We have achieved what we went into Korea to achieve. We have halted the Communist aggressors. We have helped a free republic to remain free. We have given renewed hope and confidence to other nations who might not have that hope and confidence today had we not acted. We have halted the Kremlin's global program for piecemeal aggression.

I know that it is not easy for an American mother, a wife, or fiancée who has lost a man in Korea to think of Korea as a victory. I know something of the pain, the heartache, and the tragedy which the Korean conflict has brought into so many American homes.

I know that the negotiations with the Communists in the near future will sorely try our patience even as they have in the past.

But we do have an armistice in Korea. The bloodshed there is over after 3 long years of fighting. We have won an opportunity to cement that armistice into the foundation of a genuine world peace.

As President Eisenhower put it: "We have won the opportunity to show that free people can build in peace as boldly as they fight in war."

I want to talk in some detail about the armistice in Korea. But before I do that, I would like to

comment on the complaint that other nations have not done their full share in Korea.

Some of these nations have not contributed as much in Korea as we should have liked. Some might have done more in Korea than they have.

We Americans were second only to the South Koreans as to the number of troops we had in the front lines. We did contribute the lion's share of the equipment and arms to stop the Communist aggression. Our casualties were second only to those of the Republic of Korea troops.

All of these things are true. But among the 16 other nations who have fought against the Communists in Korea are those who have thousands of men fighting the very same Communist menace elsewhere in the world.

Korea, after all, is not an island of Communist aggression. The Communist assault against the Republic of Korea was but part of a pattern for global conquest. We must not forget that. The wars in Indochina and Malaya, the Communist terrorism, the Communist pressure against Western Europe—all of these things are related to what is happening in Korea. The struggle between free men and Communist tyranny is a global one.

Contributions to the Global Struggle

What have some of the other nations who have fought with us in Korea contributed to that struggle elsewhere?

A good deal.

Take Malaya—an area of strategic, political, and economic importance not only to southeast Asia but to the free world as a whole.

The Communists tried to take over control of Malaya right after World War II. They have been fighting a guerrilla war for that control since 1948.

Our ally, Great Britain, has poured millions of dollars into Malaya to stop the Communists. Today, more than 100,000 British and Malayan troops and police are engaged in keeping the Communists from taking over.

An additional 250,000 men are being trained as part-time home guards to protect the Malayan villages from the Communist terrorists who are masters at the hit-and-run techniques.

Take the situation in Indochina. Here, the French and their Indochinese allies have been fighting the Communists for 7 long years. As of January 1953, the French and Associated States forces in Indochina totaled some 517,000 men, 148,000 of them coming from France or from French Union territories, excluding Indochina. As of the beginning of this year, France and the Associated States of Indochina had suffered more than 132,000 casualties, 48,000 of them killed or missing.

In 1952 alone, the French lost more officers in Indochina than are graduated annually from Saint Cyr, the French equivalent of our West Point.

France has already spent more than three and one-half billion dollars to finance the war against the Communists in Indochina.

Now, I don't make a habit of quoting statistics in a public speech. But I think these statistics are worth quoting, because they demonstrate that our allies—regardless of the number of troops they have had in Korea—are doing a good deal to fight the world Communist menace that many of us don't give them credit for.

The losses which we Americans have taken in Korea are grave, but the losses several of our allies have taken in Korea and elsewhere are also grave. I do not suggest that this is a fact for rejoicing or even that it makes our losses in Korea any less difficult to take. I do suggest that we Americans would be wise to take a balanced view of what we and others have sacrificed to halt the Communist aggressors.

We would also be well advised to look at the Korean situation realistically. I will admit that the armistice is not perfect. There are things in it which are probably not ideal from our point of view. We have had to make some compromises. But we have not compromised on principle. And we have not compromised on security.

Realistically speaking, the armistice is about as sound as it was possible for us to make it. It does represent a victory for America and for freedom everywhere.

We have forced the Communists to come to terms and we have done so without sacrificing our defensive strength in Korea. In fact, we have gained some considerable advantages.

The Republic of Korea today holds about five times the territory north of the old dividing line—the thirty-eighth parallel—that the Communists hold south of it.

We have stood firm on the vital prisoner-of-war issue. That issue, as you know, was the only one which kept us from reaching agreement on an armistice more than a year ago. But the Communists finally conceded. Under the truce, we will not force any prisoner of war to return to Communist control against his will. We will not be party to forced repatriation. We have stood firm on this very humane principle.

And we have gained the opportunity to demonstrate to those fighting with the Communists elsewhere in the world that they can surrender without fear of being forced to return to Communist control once the fighting is over.

This, I might say, is no mean advantage from our point of view.

Safeguards in the Armistice Agreement

But you may well ask: Are there any safeguards in the armistice agreement which will tend to keep the Communists from violating it? There are such safeguards. One provides for a demilitarized zone about 2½ miles in width (4 kilo-

meters). Frontline forces of both sides have already moved back from this area.

A Military Armistice Commission—made up of representatives of both the United Nations and the Communist forces—has assumed responsibility for seeing to it that the zone remains demilitarized.

A second safeguard is the armistice article which prohibits any additional buildup in arms on either side. Under the terms of the agreement, worn or unsuitable equipment may be replaced. But the existing strength in arms and equipment is not to be increased in any way.

A third safeguard provides that neither side can bring additional troops into Korea. However, up to 35,000 men a month may be rotated to and from Korea by either side.

A fourth safeguard is the Supervisory Commission which runs the machinery for inspecting violations of the armistice. This Commission is composed of four nations: Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Working under this commission are 20 inspection teams, 10 on each side of the demilitarized zone.

These teams are composed of representatives of the same four nations which make up the Supervisory Commission. Five of the teams on each side are stationed at the five ports of entry through which all military movements must take place. The other five teams can be sent anywhere on their side of the demilitarized zone to investigate a reported armistice violation.

Furthermore, these teams may investigate a reported violation at the request of either side. This means that we do not need to get Communist agreement in advance if we want one of the teams to check on a reported violation in Communist-controlled territory.

These, then, are some of the safeguards in the armistice agreement. They are not foolproof. But they do go far toward seeing to it that the terms of the truce are not violated.

What happens if the Communists violate the armistice despite all of these safeguards?

The best answer to that lies in the joint declaration signed by representatives of the 16 nations which fought under the U.N. Command in Korea.² That declaration—signed in Washington on July 26, 1953—states:

We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. . . .

And this is the part of the Declaration which most directly bears on the question of a Communist violation:

We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all

² BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247.

probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

That is what the 16 nations who fought against the Communist aggression in Korea have had to say about what would happen if the Communists violate the armistice.

If the Communists should be so foolhardy as to violate that armistice, I, for one, have no fears as to our ability to cope with the problem. We will still be able to do whatever we consider necessary to preserve our American security and to meet our commitments in Asia and elsewhere.

I have no doubt as to our ability to meet these commitments in the future even as we have met them in the past. We have but to maintain our material strength, the unity of the free nations and the courage of our convictions.

We can continue to do all three if we are realistic about our foreign affairs as a whole as we are now being in our Korean policy. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to be realistic. It is not always easy to see what can be accomplished and what cannot be accomplished through sound foreign policies.

Realism is particularly hard to come by when you find yourself surrounded by a great number of problems and know that meeting them is going to take a good deal of sacrifice on your part.

Some people have gotten so that they look upon the foreign-policy process as a kind of game. I had one fellow tell me recently that he thought of the United States in world affairs as a little boy trying to decide which marble to aim at in a circle loaded with dozens of them.

According to this point of view, the little boy is beset by all sorts of mental torture. He not only has to figure out which marble to shoot at but also whether or not he can really hit that marble. He is tortured by the thought that he may not hit that marble hard enough to clear the circle. And—if he is a particularly sensitive little chap—he may wonder whether he will hurt any of the other players' feelings by knocking the marble out of the circle.

I guess marbles can get to be a pretty complicated game for the devoted player.

Complexities of Foreign Policy

But the making of foreign policy is not like playing marbles or like any other game. In a world threatened by an aggressive communism which refuses to accept moral law, there is no earthly umpire who can blow a whistle when a foul is committed.

There is only power and conviction. The Communists respect these when they are found together.

But even if there were no Communist menace, the fact remains that foreign affairs cannot be conducted with scientific precision or in accordance with certain ironclad physical laws. Foreign

policies cannot be carried out with compass and slide rule. There are no mathematical equations which give us the answers to foreign policy problems.

There are just too many unknowns in foreign affairs. There are too many things happening or about to happen which no single nation or group of nations can control. The sooner we begin to accept this basic fact, the sooner we will develop the patience and the tolerance which the future will require of us.

And the better we will be able to exercise that wisdom which free world leadership requires of us.

It cannot be stressed too often that we Americans cannot, dare not go it alone in today's world. We need our friends, and they need us. We can continue to keep our friends and to work with them in a united defense of freedom only if we provide sound leadership.

Leadership, I might say, is not something we Americans went out of our way to secure. I doubt that most of us would want that leadership if we had any choice in the matter. But, my friends, we did not have a choice after World War II. We do not have a choice today.

America has come a long way since the turn of the century. But so has the world. Just 50 years ago we were still concerned with internal expansion. Parts of the Great West were still in a relatively primitive stage of development. Several States had yet to be admitted to the Union.

We fought a short war with Spain—a war which centered about what we considered to be our vital interests in the Western Hemisphere and the mid-Pacific. We did not seek leadership in world affairs in 1900.

During World War I, Woodrow Wilson could still speak of America's viewpoint as one of "disinterested international action in the main tenets of justice." Circumstances and events beyond our control—not a desire for leadership—drew us into World War I.

At the close of World War I most Americans thought that the "war to end war" had also ended our obligations to other nations. We assumed that our two broad oceans and our desire for isolation would be enough to insulate us against any and all problems that might arise in Europe and elsewhere.

We were wrong—terribly wrong. We were forced to fight a Second World War—a war against a terrible tyranny which threatened every principle we lived by as well as our security as a nation. We were forced to fight a war which acceptance of international responsibilities a few years earlier might have avoided.

Today, we know that there can be no isolation for America. In an atomic age beset by the global Communist conspiracy, what happens to free men anywhere must concern free men everywhere.

As the greatest single power, we have had to assume the leadership of the free peoples. That

leadership has demanded and will continue to demand great sacrifices of us. But we must lead whether we like it or not. Our survival depends upon our ability and our willingness to do so. However, leadership is something more than the application of sheer power. Strength alone does not make the leader.

Look back at history. You find that the majority of great men—those who have been leaders—have owed their tremendous prestige as much to their ability to use their power wisely as to power itself. They have been leaders because men have wanted to follow them.

The same rule applies to nations. America must not only speak as the leader of the free world. She must act like it.

What, then, must we Americans do?

Importance of American Principles

We must practice what we preach. We must continue to live by the principles for which we say we are willing to fight.

We must set the sort of example that other free peoples will want to follow—the example that will make crystal clear the contrast between our democracy and the totalitarian communism which seeks to destroy it.

We must appreciate the nature of our strength. We must not give in to misguided fear regardless of how difficult our problems become. We must remember that all the munitions in the world mean nothing to those who lack the moral stamina to wield them in self-defense.

When this nation of ours was just a baby, that very wise man, Benjamin Franklin, said:

Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.

Mr. Franklin is as right today as he was then. We dare not toy with any of our precious liberties in the false belief that we can find security in the process.

There can be no security for an America without individual liberty.

These are no idle words. Pressures and fears have caused other societies before ours to sacrifice their basic principles and thus brought about their collapse. Our greatest strength in these difficult times lies in our belief in ourselves and in our American tradition. To the extent that we weaken any small part of that tradition, to that extent do we weaken ourselves as a nation.

There are, I know, some patriotic Americans who are so disturbed by the menace of communism that they are beginning to wonder whether or not it would not be best to chip off a little liberty here and there to preserve the basic fundamentals of democracy.

I share their concern about communism, but not their willingness to allow the chipping of any of our liberties. The fact is that you cannot chip

any part of the structure of liberty without beginning to destroy the entire structure.

Now, I believe that we need a sound security program in this country particularly in the field of government employment. I think that the Eisenhower administration has met the need for such a program.

I believe that we need to take every conceivable security precaution against sabotage and Communist infiltration. I believe that the FBI has been doing and is doing a remarkable job in applying these precautions.

I believe that Congress has an obligation to conduct regular investigations into the manner in which the government is operating with a view to finding out whether or not the taxpayer is getting his money's worth in efficiency.

But I also believe in freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and in the right to be considered innocent until such time as you have been duly adjudged guilty by a jury sifting the evidence presented in a court of law.

I believe in freedom to express your opinion no matter how unpopular it may be. Freedom of expression lies at the very bedrock of our American democracy.

Judge Learned Hand—a great American jurist—last year made a speech which has probably been quoted from as much as any other speech in recent years. I know that Judge Hand will not mind if I add myself to the list of those who have quoted him. He said:

I believe that that community is already in process of dissolution where each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy, where non-conformity with the accepted creed, political as well as religious, is a mark of disaffection; where denunciation, without specification or backing, takes the place of evidence; where orthodoxy chokes freedom of dissent; where faith in the eventual supremacy of reason has become so timid that we dare not enter our convictions in the open lists to win or lose.

That, it seems to me, sums up what I have been trying to say about liberty.

The threat of communism today is a grave one. It has cost us dear. And it will undoubtedly be with us for a long time to come. But we need not fear for our safety as long as we maintain our strength, our principles, and our unity with the other free nations.

We need not fear a Communist victory as long as we ourselves do not become the victims of false fears spread about by those few who lack confidence in the American democracy.

America is a great nation. I believe that she is the greatest nation.

I believe that she will endure and prosper long after the Soviet tyranny has disappeared from this earth.

I believe—with President Eisenhower—that the purpose of every loyal American should be "to serve and to strengthen our people, all our people, in their faith in freedom and in their quest for peace."

U.S. Aid to Iran

IRAN REQUESTS FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Following are texts of letters exchanged on August 26 by General Fazlollah Zahedi, Prime Minister of Iran, and President Eisenhower:

Prime Minister Zahedi to the President

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I wish to express to you and through you to the American people the appreciation of the Iranian Government and people for the aid which the US has extended Iran during recent years. This aid has contributed much to the security of the country and to the raising of its technical efficiency. The assistance which the US is already rendering Iran, helpful as it is, is unfortunately not sufficient in amount and character to tide Iran over the financial and economic crisis which I find it to be facing. The treasury is empty; foreign exchange resources are exhausted; the national economy is deteriorated. Iran needs immediate financial aid to enable it to emerge from a state of economic and financial chaos.

Iran also requires aid of an economic character to enable it to carry out programs which the government is preparing for developing its agriculture and industry, for exploiting its rich mineral resources, for improving its transport and communications, for strengthening its internal and foreign trade, and for raising the health, education and technical levels of the Iranian people.

The people of Iran are anxious to have a prosperous, orderly country in which they can enjoy higher standards of living and make greater use of their talents and resources. They are willing, if given an opportunity, to work hard in order to obtain these objectives, but the realization of their aspirations may be delayed for some time unless they receive technical, financial, and economic aid from abroad. I hope that the US will find it possible at this critical moment in Iranian history to come to my country's assistance as it has done on occasions in the past.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that it is the intention of the new Government of Iran not only to strengthen the country internally but also to improve its international position. The government desires to maintain friendly relations with the other members of the family of nations on a basis of mutual respect. It will pursue a policy of eliminating such differences as may exist or which may develop between other countries and itself in a spirit of friendliness and in accordance with accepted principles of international intercourse. I am sure that I voice the feelings of the great majority of the people of Iran when I state

that Iran desires to contribute its share to the maintenance of peace and to the promotion of international goodwill.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

General F. ZAHEDI

The President to Prime Minister Zahedi

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have received your letter of August 26 regarding the problems which you face in Iran. The American people continue to be deeply interested in the independence of Iran and the well-being of the Iranian people. We have followed policies in Iran, as in other countries of the free world, designed to assist peoples of those countries to bring about economic development which will lead to higher standards of living and wider horizons in knowledge and opportunity. I am gratified that the aid which we have extended has contributed to the security of Iran and to the raising of the technical efficiency of the Iranian people. I am also pleased to have your assurance that your Government desires to maintain friendly relations with other members of the family of nations and that it will pursue a policy of eliminating such differences as may exist or which may develop with other countries in a spirit of friendliness and in accordance with accepted principles of international intercourse.

In an effort to assist you in dealing with your immediate problems, I have authorized Ambassador Henderson to consult with you regarding the development of our aid programs there. Mr. Stassen is sending immediately a special representative to Iran in order to assist Ambassador Henderson in this matter. I recognize that your needs are pressing. Your request will receive our sympathetic consideration and I can assure you that we stand ready to assist you in achieving the aspirations for your country which you have outlined.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

PRESIDENT SENDS MESSAGE TO SHAH

Ambassador Loy Henderson on August 27 conveyed to the Shah of Iran the following message from President Eisenhower:

In the spirit of friendliness which has always been the basis for the relations of our two countries, I offer you my sincere felicitations on the occasion of your happy return to your country, and my continuing good wishes for every success in your efforts to promote the prosperity of your people and to preserve the independence of Iran.

FOA PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE

The Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) announced on September 3 that 23.4 million dollars would be made available to Iran during the

1954 fiscal year to continue the present U. S. program of technical assistance in Iran.

This agreement, concluded in an exchange of letters between U. S. Ambassador Loy Henderson and Iranian Prime Minister Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, does not include the special economic assistance for Iran which is currently being discussed by representatives of the two Governments.

The technical cooperation program with Iran involves 12 programs and 71 projects which have been developed during the last 2 years.

Following are the texts of the letters:

Ambassador Henderson to Prime Minister Zahedi

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer you to prior notes between the Governments of Iran and the United States establishing a joint program of technical cooperation for economic development of Iran, as follows:

(A) Memorandum of understanding for Technical Cooperation on rural improvement between the United States of America and Iran, executed October 19, 1950, between Henry F. Grady, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, U. S. of America, and Ali Razmara, Prime Minister of Iran;¹

(B) Note of William E. Warne, Director of Technical Cooperation Mission of the U. S. of America, January 19, 1952, to Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, Prime Minister, Imperial Government of Iran, and his reply thereto under date of January 20, 1952;²

(C) Note of W. E. Warne, U.S. Director of Technical Cooperation for Iran, to Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, Prime Minister of Iran, December 27, 1952, and his reply thereto under date of December 30, 1952.

Pursuant to and on the terms and conditions contained in these notes and hereinafter set forth, the U.S. of America is prepared to make available for technical and economic aid during the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, up to \$23,400,000 including costs of U.S. technicians and training costs outside Iran, which costs will not be included in program or project agreements.

The Governments of Iran and the U.S. have heretofore executed, pursuant to above referenced notes and memorandum, twelve program agreements and 71 project agreements providing detailed plans and creating operational responsibilities and duties. It is, therefore, proposed that the Government of the U.S. of America, by this note, and the Government of Iran, by its reply thereto, signify their acceptance and approval of the Technical Cooperation program in Iran by affirming all memoranda, correspondence, agreements and other documents relating to the Techni-

¹ For the Department's announcement of this agreement, see BULLETIN of Oct. 30, 1950, p. 703.

² For a summary of this exchange of notes, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 217.

cal Cooperation program in Iran, and by rededicating their joint efforts to the social and economic development of Iran.

If these proposals are acceptable to Your Excellency's Government, it is requested that you notify me of Your Excellency's concurrence on behalf of the Government of Iran. I shall be pleased to meet at an early date with the Joint Commission to take up continuing problems and plans.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

LOY W. HENDERSON

Prime Minister Zahedi to Ambassador Henderson

SEPTEMBER 1

EXCELLENCY: Your note of September 1, 1953, offering up to \$23,400,000 for technical and economic aid during the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, and proposing the confirmation of the Technical Cooperation program now in operation in Iran, has received the approval of my government.

In response to your proposals, this government will expedite the fulfillment of programs designed to advance the welfare of the people of Iran. The Joint Commission will be continued as before with the following members representing the Government of Iran: Minister of Interior, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Health, Minister of Education, Minister of National Economy, Managing Director of the Plan Organization.

The formation of the Commission is entrusted to the Managing Director of the Plan Organization.

In the absence of any of the above Ministers their respective under-secretaries will take part in the meetings of the Joint Commission.

General FAZLOLLAH ZAHEDI

Prime Minister

PRESIDENT MAKES AVAILABLE \$45 MILLION IN EMERGENCY AID

White House Office press release dated Sept. 5

In response to a request for urgent assistance from the new Government of Iran, the President has made available on an emergency basis \$45 million which will be used for the immediate economic assistance of Iran in accordance with the procedures of the Foreign Operations Administration under the Mutual Security Act. This amount is in addition to existing U.S. technical assistance and military programs in Iran.

There is great need for immediate assistance to restore a measure of stability and establish a foundation for greater economic development and improvement in the living standards for all of the people of Iran. It is hoped that, with our assistance, there will be an increase in the internal stability of Iran which will allow the development of a healthy economy to which an early effective use of Iran's rich resources will contribute.

U. S. Renews Invitation to U. S. S. R. To Attend Meeting on Germany and Austria

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 2

Press release 471 dated Sept. 2

1. The United States Government, in its customary close consultation with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, has carefully studied the Soviet Government's notes of August 4 and 15, 1953, which were in reply to proposals presented on July 15 by the three Western powers.¹ The Government of the German Federal Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been consulted.

2. The United States Government has no intention once again to refute the Soviet Government's criticisms of policy followed by the three powers, nor of thus prolonging a sterile discussion which can only be harmful to the cause of peace.

3. The United States Government therefore fully reserves its position in regard to the various allegations in the Soviet notes of August 4 and 15, and will confine its comments to the problems of an urgent nature which arise in connection with the meeting of the Foreign Ministers proposed in its note of July 15.

4. Real progress toward peace and toward a lessening of international tension would be achieved were it possible to find an early solution of some of the existing problems concerning Germany and to conclude the Austrian state treaty. It therefore appears desirable that the meeting of the Foreign Ministers should devote itself to these problems; whereas to inject into the discussion a series of other complex questions, as proposed by the Soviet Government, could only delay and prejudice the success of the talks. A solution of the German and Austrian problems could be expected to pave the way for fruitful discussion of other major questions. The United States Government also wishes to point out that the study of some of these other questions has already been entrusted to such international organizations as the United Nations or to international bodies such as the political conference on Korea where the Chinese People's Republic will be represented. The latter's participation in the proposed meeting

of Foreign Ministers of the four powers could not therefore be justified.

5. The Soviet Government has suggested a procedure for dealing with the German problem which appears complicated, and work on such a basis could, at best, only be long drawn out. The Soviet Government's note of August 15 envisages, in effect, a series of devices which could result in postponing to some indeterminate date the holding of free elections in the Federal Republic, in the East Zone of Germany, and in Berlin. An All-German Government which is not based on the will of the people as expressed in free elections would not be qualified to take vital decisions affecting the future of the United Germany. The problem of free elections is thus the key to any all-German settlement. The United States Government therefore considers that the meeting of the Foreign Ministers should devote itself to the German problem, the solution of which is an essential part of a world settlement, and concentrate in the first instance on the question of free elections and the status of the future German Government.

6. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that when the United States Government proposed, in its note of July 15, that the problem of free elections be considered first, it did not make any prior condition that an investigating commission be established. It seems, therefore, that on this point the Soviet Government has misinterpreted the terms of this note.

7. The United States Government has never considered that the re-establishment of freedom and independence of Austria, which by terms of the Moscow declaration of November 1943 must be considered as a liberated country, should be dependent upon progress toward a solution of the German problem. It considers that these two problems are quite distinct. In its view nothing should now prevent the conclusion of an Austrian treaty. It therefore regrets the failure of the Soviet Government to accept its proposal that the Austrian treaty deputies should meet on August 31.² It nevertheless remains the hope of the United States Government that the Foreign Minis-

¹ The United Kingdom and France sent similar replies on Sept. 2. For text of the July 15 proposals, see BULLETIN of July 27, 1953, p. 107.

² For text of the U.S. note of Aug. 17 relating to the Austrian treaty, see *ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1953, p. 282.

ters will be able to agree on the Austrian state treaty when they themselves meet.

8. The United States Government is convinced that progress is more likely to be made by discussion of these problems than by a further exchange of notes. Consequently, it renews its invitation to the Soviet Government to participate in a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers which could take place on October 15 at Lugano. It understands that this would be agreeable to the Swiss Government.

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 4

[Unofficial translation]

On July 15 the Soviet Government received a note of the Government of the United States of America and simultaneously notes of the Governments of England and France from which it is apparent that, at the July Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, England, and France in Washington, it was decided to call a Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three powers referred to above and of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the agenda proposed by the three Ministers and time of convocation of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, England, France, and the Soviet Union were communicated in notes.

It follows from what has been said above that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, England, and France contrary to international custom, have taken upon themselves a preliminary examination of questions for the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four powers without the participation of a representative of the Soviet Union. Such a situation cannot be recognized as normal. Moreover, it is in obvious contradiction to existing agreements on conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the preliminary collusion of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs could exercise a negative influence on the entire course of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four powers. Such a conclusion naturally flows from the fact that three participants in this Conference have previously bound themselves by separate agreements, without even having attempted to bring about, as has frequently been done previously, a free discussion unhampered by any private obligations of ripe international problems. Under present international conditions, conferences of the powers have great significance for the regulation of international questions in dispute. It is precisely at this time when efforts of peace-loving governments have made it possible to put an end to war in Korea and conclude an armistice that favorable conditions have been created for achieving a lessening of tension in the international situation. It goes without saying that a successful solution of this task depends primarily upon efforts of all peace-loving states, great and small. However, the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security rests primarily, as is evident from the Charter of the United Nations organization, on five powers—the United States, England, France, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Peoples' Republic. It would not be in the interests of maintenance and strengthening of peace and international security to ignore this circumstance. On the other hand, to ascribe any special significance to such events as the Fascist adventure of June 17 in Berlin—which was the handiwork of international hirelings and criminal elements—means to give one's self up to illusions and to distract attention from the facts which are really important and have a positive significance for easing of international relations.

In view of the considerations adduced above, the Soviet Government takes the position that at a Conference of Foreign Ministers there should be considered the question of measures which promote a general lessening of tension in international relations, including questions of reduction of armaments and impermissibility of foreign military bases on territory of other states. Moreover, the possibility should not be excluded of considering questions of in just what composition these or other problems of international relations should be considered.

The necessity for an examination of the questions referred to is dictated not only by the state of affairs in Europe. It is known that the situation of the countries of Asia with its serious current problems is also attracting the attention of international circles. From this it also follows that the participation of the Chinese Peoples' Republic is necessary in a discussion of questions concerning measures for lessening tension in international relations. The great Chinese people, united and unified by the Chinese Peoples' Republic as never before, with full justification now demand restoration of their legitimate rights in all international affairs and to underestimate the importance of an urgent solution of this question would also not be in the interests of strengthening peace and international security.

In connection with the note of the Government of the United States of America of July 15, the Soviet Government expresses its agreement to examine the German question at the Conference of Ministers. However, in the American note of July 15, as in the published communiqué of the Washington Conference of the three Foreign Ministers,³ instead of an actual examination of the German question the entire matter in fact is reduced to a repetition of the proposal which was contained in the American note of September 23 of last year,⁴ ignoring the necessity of resolving the basic problems of Germany.

As is well known German people are interested first of all in the solution of such questions as realization of national unification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty. But it is precisely the solution of these basic problems of Germany which the American note of July 15 of this year disregards, citing note of September 23, 1952, which also ignored the necessity of solving these basic questions. The note of the Government of the United States of America of July 15 substitutes for a solution of these basic problems of Germany a proposal for all-German elections, but the very question of elections according to the American note of September 23 of last year is in turn replaced by the proposal to designate a so-called neutral commission made up of representatives of foreign states "for an investigation with the aim of creating conditions" for conducting these elections. From what has been said above it follows that the United States note of July 15 not only does not have as its aim the promoting of a solution of the basic questions of Germany, but reduces the matter to prolonged discussions—whether or not the situation in Germany should be investigated by some foreign representatives or other, how and for what purpose to conduct all of these "investigations" humiliating for the German people etc. Apart from the unnecessary and pointless negotiations on such questions, there is nothing to be expected from this sort of proposal.

All this determines the attitude of the Soviet Government to the above-mentioned proposal of the Government of the United States of America.

The Soviet Government considers that such a proposal not only cannot contribute to unification of Germany and creation of an all-German democratic government or to conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, but will as a consequence leave Germany split into Western and Eastern parts and as before delay the conclusion of a peace treaty. Simultaneously measures for remilitarization of

³ *Ibid.*, July 27, 1953, p. 104.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1952, p. 517.

A Test of Soviet Good Faith

Press release 473 dated September 3

At his press conference on September 3, Secretary Dulles made the following statement:

The continued partition of Germany is a scandal. It is more than that. It is a crime. Originally, there were four zones of occupation, one each for Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. This was designed as a convenient way for the Allies to administer the first phases of the surrender terms. It was never intended that Germany should be indefinitely partitioned. Britain, France, and the United States over 4 years ago put their zones together. The Soviet Union has stubbornly held on to the part of Germany it occupies.

This is not only wrong to the Germans; it is a menace to the peace. The Germans in the Soviet zone, now cut off from their fellows for over 8 years and subjected to the despotic rule of Soviet puppets, are becoming increasingly restless. Their pathetic economic plight is shown by the eagerness with which they seek the food packages made available to them in West Berlin. They have sought these by the millions, even at great personal risk. Their growing resentment at their rulers is shown by the riots and strikes which led even unarmed Germans with stones to seek to resist the Red Army tanks which were sent to subdue them.

Now, in an effort to curry favor with the Germans, particularly having in mind the coming elections, the Soviet leaders have made another of a long series of propaganda gestures in giving lip service to the idea of German unity. However, they have surrounded this with conditions which would effectively nullify any practical result. For example, in their note of August 4, the Soviet Union proposed that Communist China should be brought into Foreign Minister consultations dealing with such proposals as that of German unity. It is hard to conceive of any proposition better calculated to prevent any constructive result. Surely the solution of Germany should not be subordinated to a solution of China nor should the fate of Germans be left to Chinese Communists.

The Soviet Union has also said that before there could be German unity, there must be a German

peace treaty and that its own puppet regime in East Germany must participate in the making of that peace treaty.

A peace treaty with the Allies, including the Soviet Union, when German sentiment was purportedly represented by the Soviet puppet regime in East Germany, would hardly be a peace treaty which gave genuine expression to the wishes of the Germans. Such a treaty could not be expected to be indefinitely accepted by the Germans.

It is the view of Great Britain, France, and the United States that the first step for the solution of the problem of Germany is to have all-German free elections to bring about unification. When that has happened, then there will be a truly representative German government and then the Allies can make a peace treaty which, if accepted by the all-German Government, will have a true endorsement on the part of the German people which they can be expected to honor.

In the hope of bringing this matter to a prompt solution, the three Western allies have proposed a meeting with the Soviet Union on October 15 to discuss in the first instance the establishment, by all-German free elections, of a government which would unify Germany. We also hope at that meeting to conclude an Austrian peace treaty.

In the interest of speed the three Western allies have eliminated from their note all controversial matter and have not attempted to rebut the vast series of arguments and implications contained in the two preceding Soviet notes of August 4 and August 15. Our proposal is simple—a meeting on October 15 which would concentrate in the first instance on the question of free elections and the status of the future German government. This is what the Germans themselves want, as shown by the Bundestag resolution of June 10, adopted with the support of all political parties, except the Communists.

The response of the Soviet Union to this proposal will be another test of whether the Soviet Union desires in good faith to solve outstanding problems which threaten international peace and which create grave international tension. We hope for a favorable response.

Western Germany are being carried on, a danger which the peace-loving peoples of Europe and in particular the neighboring states cannot disregard. If all this is conducted in agreed consultation with the Bonn Government of Adenauer as is stated in the note of July 15, then this can only destroy completely the confidence of the German people in such a government to say nothing of other peoples of Europe.

Despite considerations expressed above concerning the note of the Government of the United States of America of July 15, the Soviet Government attaches great importance to joint consideration of the German question by the powers and moreover hopes that such a consideration will make it possible to examine thoroughly pertinent problems relating to the restoration of German unity and, together with a decision of the question of a peace treaty with Germany, will contribute to strengthening of the peace in Europe.

Proceeding from above, the Soviet Government proposes:

1. Taking into account the foregoing, to examine at a Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs measures for lessening of tension in international relations;

2. To consider at the Conference, the German question, including the problem of restoration of German unity and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

As regards the Austrian treaty, the position of the Soviet Government of this question is set forth in its notes of July 30 sent to the Governments of the United States of America, England and France. It goes without saying that possible successes in settlement of the German problem could also contribute to a decision of the Austrian treaty as well.

The Soviet Government is sending similar notes to the Governments of England, France.

Moscow, August 4, 1953.

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 15

[Unofficial translation]

The Soviet Government considers it necessary once again to call the attention of the Government of the United States of America as well as the Governments of England and France to the abnormal situation in which Germany, 8 years after the end of the war in Europe, is without a peace treaty, remains split into Eastern and Western parts, and is in unequal position with relation to other states. Such a situation contradicts the aspirations of peace-loving peoples for strengthening of peace in Europe and is, moreover, a violation of the legitimate national interests of the German people.

As far back as March 10, 1952, the Soviet Government presented for consideration of the Governments of the United States of America, England, and France a draft of bases for a peace treaty with Germany in connection with which the Governments of the United States of America, England, and France have not, up to the present time, expressed their attitude. (Draft of bases of peace treaty with Germany is enclosed.)⁵ The Governments of the United States of America, England, and France have also not presented their draft of the peace treaty. It follows from this that the governments of the three indicated powers underestimate the importance of the question of a peace treaty with Germany. The question of a peace treaty with Germany is being dragged out more and more, for which the responsibility is borne primarily by the Governments of the United States of America, England, and France.

Refusing to examine the question of a peace treaty with Germany, the Governments of the United States of America, England, and France embarked upon another course on May 26, 1952. The Governments of the United States of America, England, and France along with the Bonn Government of Adenauer signed "Treaty on Relations Between Three Powers and Federal Republic of Germany," which is known as the "Bonn agreement"; and on May 27 of the same year, the treaty for "European Defense Community" known by the name of the "Paris agreement" was signed along with the Bonn Government by the Governments of France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. Thereby, both the "Bonn agreement" as well as the "Paris agreement" are indissolubly bound for 50 years to come with the aggressive North Atlantic bloc of powers.

As is known, the sense of the "Paris agreement" is that armed forces entering into the composition of the so-called "European army" destined for aggressive aims of North Atlantic bloc are to be created in Western Germany under the leadership of Hitlerite generals and other revanchists. According to the "Bonn agreement" Western Germany will remain in the position of dependent State subordinated to the three powers which, regardless of formal abolition of the Occupation Statute, maintain their troops on the territory of Western Germany with unlimited rights of interference in its internal affairs. This preserves for many years enslavement of the Western German population under conditions of modified occupation regime.

This means the Bonn and Paris agreements are leading to the rebirth of German militarism and to the transformation of Western Germany into a tool of aggressive plans of other powers which pretend to world domination.

As can be seen from the communique of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, England, and France which took place in July 1953 in Washington, the Governments of the three powers decided to pursue the further policy directed toward realization of a plan to create the "European Army" and to include in it West German armed forces led by Hitlerite generals. In the communique it is shown outright that the "Three Foreign Ministers reaffirm their strong intention to pursue ener-

getically the policy upon which their governments agreed within the framework of the Atlantic Treaty. This policy includes work on creation of European unity of six European countries which have already created unification of coal and steel and whose governments have signed the treaty for a European defense community". The course which the Governments of the United States of America, England and France have taken in the German question is leading to the rebirth of German militarism, to the creation of dangerous focus of new aggression, to continuing increase of danger of a new war in Europe. To follow this course means to renounce those solemn international obligations which set up the goal of promoting the restoration of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state and which were undertaken by the United States of America and England at the Potsdam conference in 1945 and subsequently adhered to by France.

The other course is the course which corresponds to peace-loving goals and obligations undertaken by the four powers with regard to Germany immediately after the ending of the war and which respond to the interests of strengthening peace in Europe. In this connection however it is impossible not to recognize the fact that since the time of the Potsdam conference 8 years have passed and that since that time not a few changes have come about which must be taken into account at the final regulation of the German problem. However the basic aims of the Potsdam agreement—to promote the creation of a peace-loving Germany—express as before the interests of all European peoples including the German people and must be guaranteed by means of concluding a peace treaty with Germany.

The solution of this task will create conditions for an unprecedented growth of Germany with its great possibilities for the development of its economy and culture. No one can deny that the rebirth of Germany as a great power worthy of occupying a corresponding place among other powers is possible only by way of the peaceful and democratic development of the German State, by way of friendly cooperation with other states striving for strengthening of peace and international security. The experience of history shows more than once already the course of war has led Germany to national catastrophe and that the German people have paid dearly as a consequence.

There is no doubt that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has first rank significance for the settlement of the German problem. It will in decisive fashion contribute to stabilizing peace in Europe and will permit definitive decision on appropriate questions having arisen as the result of the Second World War in which are vitally interested the European states which have suffered from Hitlerite aggression, and first of all Germany's neighbors. The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is also necessary in view of the fact that the threat of reestablishment of German militarism, which has twice unleashed world war, has not been removed in as much as appropriate decisions of the Potsdam conference still remain unfulfilled. The peace treaty with Germany will establish stable conditions of peace for the German people, will contribute to the development of Germany as a united, independent, democratic and peace-loving state, will assure the German people of the possibility of peaceful cooperation with other peoples on the basis of equal rights.

The Governments of the United States of America, England, and France justify their refusal to consider the peace treaty with Germany by the fact that there does not as yet exist an all-German Government which could take part in the preparation of the treaty. However, such type of motives for refusal to consider the peace treaty do not correspond with the real state of affairs. In reality the policy of the United States of America, England, and France will lead to the result that not only will the consideration of the question of a peace treaty be even further postponed, since this policy is directed at reinforcing division of Germany, toward prohibiting reestablishment of German unity.

⁵ *Ibid*, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 532.

At the present time more and more new measures of pressure are being carried out in order that the Bonn and Paris agreements be ratified by appropriate states despite serious opposition which exists on the part of parliaments of several states. This pressure, and especially on the part of the U.S. Government, has the aim of hastening the creation of armed forces of Western Germany and their inclusion in the "European Army" provided for by the Paris agreement in order to turn Western Germany, which is dependent on the states of the North Atlantic bloc, into a weapon for the implementation of plans of this bloc. But the inclusion of Western Germany in a "European Army" and the North Atlantic bloc will render impossible the unification of Western and Eastern Germany into one state. The peace-loving peoples of all Europe are interested in the establishment of a united and peace-loving Germany, as the German people itself is also interested in this. But from that time when the Bonn Government brings Western Germany into the aggressive North Atlantic bloc the unification of Western and Eastern Germany will be rendered impossible. For exactly this reason the overwhelming majority of the Germans not only in the German Democratic Republic but also in Western Germany oppose plans of the Adenauer Government for bringing Western Germany into the "European Army" and the North Atlantic bloc, and in this regard the peace-loving peoples of all Europe are on their side.

From what has been said above it is evident that the policy of the Governments of the United States of America, England, and France, and equally of the Adenauer Government, is directed not toward unification of Germany and not toward formation of an all-German government but toward leaving Germany divided into parts for many years. Such policy is directly aimed opposition to the formation of an all-German Democratic Government.

Consequently, the refusal to consider a peace treaty with Germany under the pretext of nonexistence of an all-German Government does not reflect real motives for this refusal.

From what has been said above it is also evident that the present policy of the Governments of the United States of America, England, and France is directed both against deciding the question of a peace treaty and against unification of Germany on a peace-loving and democratic basis, against formation of an all-German Democratic Government.

The Governments of the United States of America, England, and France instead of deciding the question of the formation of an all-German Democratic Government introduce a different proposal. They propose to discuss the question of all-German elections but reduce this matter to consideration by the four powers of their proposal for appointment of a so-called neutral commission from representatives of foreign states "for investigation with the aim of creating conditions" for conducting these elections.

It is impossible to evaluate this other than as an attempt to transfer the conduct of elections in Germany to the hands of foreign powers, to foist on the German people for this purpose all sorts of foreign "investigators," as if the matter concerns not Germany which has democratic traditions of many years standing, but some sort of colony without rights. Such a proposal leads to pushing the German people aside from the decision of its internal question, is an expression of crude lack of faith in the German people and, naturally, is met with rebuff on the part of wide circles of the German population.

The above indicated proposal of the Governments of the United States of America, England, and France in its essence departs from the principles of democratism which found its expression in the Potsdam decisions. This proposal, according to the statement of the three powers, has been agreed upon with the Adenauer Government, which serves the interests of the greatest capitalist monopolies of Western Germany, which more and more

unleashes the hands of yesterday's Hitlerites and open Fascists for the suppression of German democratic forces, which represents the mouthpiece of extreme German nationalists and revanchists, who are striving for the re-birth of German militarism for new aggressive wars. In this connection it is impossible to forget that the Adenauer Government has invariably come out against the very possibility of coordinating the policy of the four powers on the German question, since it has completely tied its fate with the plans for the reestablishment of German militarism, with the plans for the preparation of a new war in Europe. Exactly for these antipopular purposes, it is striving for the ratification of the Paris and Bonn agreements despite the fact that these agreements contradict the national interests of the German people and mean turning Western Germany into a dependent state, enslaving the Western German population for many years.

The Bonn agreement as well as the Paris agreement have nothing in common with the interests of reestablishment of unity of democratic Germany and the real purposes of these agreements are directed against the basic principles of the Potsdam conference, at which the United States of America, England, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and also France which acceded to it, decided to assure the reestablishment of a united Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state.

From all that has been said above it is evident that the question of the reestablishment of national unity of Democratic Germany was and remains the fundamental question for the German people, in decision of which are interested the peace-loving people of all Europe. No sort of pretexts can justify further delay in this matter inasmuch as under present conditions the chief responsibility for its decision rests on the Governments of the United States of America, England, France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In any case there must not be postponed such measures as can serve even the gradual settlement of the question of unification of Germany, of formation of an all-German Democratic Government.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is approaching the Government of the United States of America and also the Governments of England and France with a proposal to take now practical measures aimed at the settlement of the German problem.

In accordance with what is set forth above the Soviet Government considers as urgent the settlement of the following basic questions with regard to Germany:

1. The convocation of a peace conference for the examination of the question of a peace treaty with Germany.

The Soviet Government proposes that such a conference with the participation of all interested states can be convoked within the next 6 months and sees no basis for further postponement of the convocation of a peace conference. All preparatory work for the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany could be completed within the above-mentioned period. In connection therewith it is important to assure the appropriate participation of representatives of Germany at all stages of the preparation of a peace treaty and at a peace conference. Prior to the formation of a provisional all-German Government the representatives of the existing governments of East and West Germany could take part in the preparation of the peace treaty.

2. The formation of a provisional all-German Government and the carrying out of free all-German elections.

For the purpose of restoration of German national unity on peace-loving and democratic bases the Soviet Government proposes that the parliaments of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic with the broad participation of democratic organizations should form a provisional all-German Government. Such a government can be created by means of a direct agreement between East and West Germany as a substitute

for presently existing governments of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. In the event that this proves to be difficult at the given time the provisional all-German Government can be established with retention for a certain period of the governments of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. At the same time in this event the provisional German Government obviously will have in the first stage only limited functions. However, in such a situation also the establishment of a provisional all-German government will represent in itself a real step forward on the path of reunification of Germany which must receive its full completion in the creation of an all-German Government on the basis of really free all-German elections.

The tasks of the provisional all-German Government:

A. The provisional all-German Government could decide such urgent questions of all-German significance as the representation of Germany in the preparation of a peace treaty and also representation in international organizations; the inadmissibility of involvement of Germany in coalitions or military alliances directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Hitlerite Germany; the questions of German citizenship; the guarantee of free activity of democratic parties and organizations and the inadmissibility of the existence of Fascist militaristic and other organizations hostile to democracy and to the cause of preservation of peace; the expansion of trade relations between East and West Germany; questions of transport, postal and telegraphic communications; questions of free movement of peoples and goods independent of established zonal frontiers; the development of economic and cultural ties between East and West Germany and other questions affecting the interests of the entire German people.

B. A chief task of the provisional all-German Government furthermore must be the preparation and carrying out of all-German free elections as a result of which the German people itself without interference of foreign powers will decide the question of social and state structure in a democratic Germany. The provisional all-German Government must work out a draft of an all-German electoral law guaranteeing the really democratic character of all-German elections, the participation in the elections of all democratic organizations and the inadmissibility of pressure on the electors from the great monopolies. On its free decision must depend the recognition of expediency of verification of existence in all Germany of conditions necessary for the carrying out of democratic elections as well as adoption of measures for guaranteeing such conditions. In addition the Soviet Government considers it necessary that measures be taken by the Governments of the United States of America, England, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for carrying out of all-German elections under conditions of genuine freedom with the exclusion of any pressure whatsoever on the part of foreign powers in the carrying out of these elections.

3. The easing of the financial and economic obligations of Germany connected with the consequences of the war.

Taking into consideration that Germany has already carried out an important part of its financial and economic obligations in regard to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, England, and France connected with the consequences of the war and considering the necessity of easing the economic situation of Germany, the Soviet Government recognizes the urgency of adopting in this connection appropriate decisions.

A. The Soviet Government considers it necessary beginning January 1, 1954, that Germany be freed completely from the payment of reparations and equally from the payment to the four powers of postwar state debts with the exception of indebtedness for commercial obligations.

B. The Soviet Union considers it also necessary to limit the extent of expenditures connected with the

presence of forces of the four powers on the territory of Germany. For this purpose it is proposed that the sum of expenses for maintenance of these forces annually should not exceed 5 percent of the revenues of the state budget of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic and in any event should not exceed the sum of the occupation expenditures of 1949 when the extent of the occupational expenditures had not yet been affected by the formation of the North Atlantic Bloc. The Soviet Government proposes in addition that Germany should be completely freed of payments of indebtedness for foreign occupation expenditures of the four powers which were created after 1945. The Soviet Government is confident that an agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, England, and France on the German question and the adoption in the near future of decisions in accordance with proposals outlined above would serve to reduce tension in international relations, assisting thereby in the strengthening of peace and international security.

Results of Election in Western Germany

In reply to questions as to the Department's reaction to the outcome of the election held on September 6 in Western Germany, a Department spokesman made the following statement to correspondents on September 7:

The results of the election in Western Germany constitute an overwhelming endorsement of the policies of the Adenauer Government; that is to say, of German membership in the European community, of democratic reconstruction and of uncompromising opposition to Soviet designs.

One of the most gratifying aspects of the elections is the emergence of the democratic parties as the only political forces to be represented in the new Bundestag and a clear repudiation of all anti-democratic extremist groups both of the Right and of the Left.

West German Housing Program

The Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) on August 28 announced the earmarking of \$15 million of mutual security funds for allotment during the 1954 fiscal year to West Germany in support of the German refugee program.

Under an agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic announced in Bonn, the 63 million DM in counterpart funds, which will be generated by the American dollars, will be used to construct additional housing for refugees.

Most of the housing units will be constructed in Western Germany, in those areas which have the greatest employment potential. Funds will be used in West Berlin to relieve present shortages for refugees and will also contribute toward solving long-term housing requirements in Berlin.

Expropriation of United Fruit Company Property by Government of Guatemala

Press release 464 dated August 28

In an aide-memoire handed the Ambassador of Guatemala on August 28, the Department of State gave the views of the Government of the United States concerning the expropriation last March by the Government of Guatemala of 234,000 acres of land belonging to the United Fruit Company in Guatemala, for which compensation has been proffered the company in the form of Guatemalan Government 3 percent "agrarian bonds" maturing in 25 years and in a face value equivalent to the tax value of the land as recorded on May 9, 1952.

Referring to contentions by the Government of Guatemala that the proffered compensation was fair and just, the aide-memoire stated that "the fixing of the amount of the bonds on the basis of tax value of the properties, especially in the light of tax-evaluation procedures followed in the instant case by the Guatemalan authorities, bears not the slightest resemblance to just evaluation."

The aide-memoire stated that according to the facts as understood by the Government of the United States, the company endeavored for almost 5 years to raise the tax evaluations of its lands, following procedures prescribed by Guatemala toward this end, but that the values declared by the company were never entered in the tax records.

The Department also stated that "payment in bonds maturing in 25 years, with interest at 3 percent per annum, and of uncertain market value is scarcely to be regarded as either prompt or effective payment." The aide-memoire added that "The obligation of a state imposed by international law to pay just or fair compensation at the time of taking of property of foreigners cannot be abrogated from the international standpoint by local legislation. If the contrary were true, states seeking to avoid the necessity of making payment for property expropriated from foreign nationals could avoid all pecuniary responsibility simply by changing their local law. Every international obligation could thus be wiped off the books. But international law cannot thus be

flouted. Membership in the family of nations imposes international obligations."

In connection with U.N. General Assembly resolution 636 (VII) of December 21, 1952, cited by the Guatemalan Government in support of its position, the aide-memoire pointed out that "... nothing contained in the resolution referred to, authorized or purported to authorize states in the exercise of their sovereignty in developing their natural wealth and resources, to violate rights of other states or their nationals under international law. The resolution referred to clearly recommends that consideration be given by member states to 'the need for maintaining the flow of capital in conditions of security, mutual confidence, and economic cooperation among nations' in the exercise of the right freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources. As is well known, the undermining of confidence on the part of foreign investors is a direct result of Guatemala's expropriation of foreign-owned property; the resolution warned that this would be the result."

The Department said in its aide-memoire that "the United States can only expect that the Government of Guatemala, as a sovereign state and as a member of the family of nations, will conduct its affairs with justness, with reasonableness and with fairness. It is to be hoped that the two Governments shall achieve such a formula for the settlement of the present matter."

Following is the text of the aide-memoire:

In the Guatemalan Embassy's Memorandum left at the Department on June 26, 1953,¹ there is set forth the position of the Government of Guatemala concerning the expropriation of certain lands located in Guatemala and owned by *Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala*, a Delaware corporation duly registered to do business in Guatemala and a wholly-owned subsidiary of the United Fruit Company, a New Jersey corporation.

The Government of the United States is constrained to discuss certain assumptions on which the Guatemalan Memorandum is premised in order to clarify further the United States position in the matter.

¹ Not printed.

In the Guatemalan Memorandum it is stated that the lands taken from the *Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala* under the Agrarian Reform Law (Decree 900 of the Congress of the Republic) were unproductive and vacant lands that were of no real benefit to the Company or its stockholders. This statement is based upon an erroneous appraisal of the facts.

The expropriated lands formed a part of the land areas acquired by the Company to carry out large-scale development on the West Coast. The contract between the *Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala* and the Government of Guatemala authorized the Company to operate its business and properties until 1981. The Company has invested large sums of money in railways, buildings, irrigation and disease-control systems, hospital and dispensaries, sanitation, and other general facilities which could only be justified on a long-term basis. It is well known that banana cultivations have a limited life because of Panama disease and must be replaced from time to time by new cultivations in order to continue profitable operations. The expropriated lands contained sufficient areas suitable for banana cultivation to have enabled the Company to maintain its cultivations in an area adequate for profitable operations during the remaining period of the contract. The expropriation thus deprives the Company of these banana reserve lands. The expropriated areas were very valuable to the Company as an integral part of the larger enterprise.

Furthermore, large areas of the expropriated lands were actually being put to important use in the Company's operations. The Company annually uses a large amount of lumber in its operations and sufficient lumber to meet its requirements was obtained from the expropriated areas. In addition, the Company had profitable lumbering contracts for the cutting of lumber in this area by others. The lands also furnished a source of supply for thousands of banana props which are used on the banana farms each year. Over 11,500 acres were leased to employees for the production of vegetables and fruits for their own consumption and for sale to the Company for its mess hall, hospital and commissaries. These lands were all expropriated. The Company requires a large supply of meat currently for its thousands of employees, and to provide for this meat supply leasing and cattle raising contracts were entered into with John Wharton Smith y *Compañía, Ltda.* and Jose Maria Valdes Garcia. Of the 62,409 acres leased to John Wharton Smith y *Compañía, Ltda.*, 60,283 acres were expropriated, making it necessary for the lessee to abandon his cattle-raising operations. Of the 33,420 acres leased to Valdes Garcia, 23,229 acres were taken. The Company also had leased a total of 4,248 acres to Prado Velez for agricultural purposes, and of this amount, 4,086 acres were expropriated. It is clear, therefore, from the foregoing that the expropriated lands could not be considered as unproductive and vacant and of no value to the Company.

In the Memorandum under reference, it is stated that effective methods of controlling the spread of Panama disease and even of eradicating it have already been put into practice and that the *Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala* keeps in its possession areas reasonably adequate for the continuance of its agricultural operations on a profitable basis. It is necessary to explain that so far as the Panama disease is concerned, if lands are situated so that they can be flooded for a long period, and if the soil texture is such that the land will hold water for such period, the banana productivity of the land can be restored for a time, but the disease returns. This Government is advised that flood fallowing is not feasible on the West Coast of Guatemala, even in those cases where the lands are so situated that they may be flooded, because of the porosity of the soil.

The *Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala* has already abandoned because of Panama disease over 7,000 acres of banana cultivations on the West Coast, representing about 27% of the total area planted. Considering the

age of existing cultivations, it is reasonable to suppose that the abandonments from now on will be at a more rapid rate. Since the decree of expropriation took from the Company practically all of its reserve banana lands, the Company is now faced with decreasing production, as the cultivations are abandoned because of disease, and the eventual loss of its banana business in that area. It is for this reason that this Government's Aide-Memoire of March 25, 1953, pointed out that the expropriation would have this result and stated that the United States Government does not believe that it is the intention of the Government of Guatemala to construe and administer the law in such a way as to make continued operations of the Company impossible.

It is sought in the Guatemalan Memorandum to make it appear that the action taken cannot be complained against because the Agrarian Reform Law (Decree 900 of the Congress of the Republic) is a general law, applicable equally to nationals and foreigners.

On the point of alleged equality of treatment, or non-discrimination, as between nationals and foreigners, it is to be noted that on the basis of data announced by the National Agrarian Department itself, published on June 16, 1953, the total acreage of private land thus far expropriated under the Agrarian Reform Law is some 377,000 acres, against which the total Tiquisate land expropriated is 234,000 acres, or almost two-thirds of the entire amount seized. In addition, under a Resolution of August 6, 1953, the National Agrarian Council ordered the expropriation of more than 173,000 acres on the Atlantic side, belonging to the United Fruit Company, which will become final if approved by the President of Guatemala. Such a high disproportion raises the very serious question of discrimination, despite assertions to the contrary.

Further, the United States Government must point out that international law does not authorize States to do any and every act, so long as such act is imposed on nationals and foreigners on a basis of equality or without discrimination. What a state may do with respect to its nationals or their property is a matter largely between that state and its nationals, for the reason that nationals of a state are presumed to be able to take corrective measures looking to the protection of their rights.

The Government of the United States is warranted in expecting not only that the law of Guatemala shall be applied fairly as to American nationals, without discrimination, but also that both the law itself and its application shall conform at least to minimum standards required by international law.

It is next argued in the Guatemalan Memorandum—with reference to the Agrarian Reform Law—that "its application constitutes an act of inherent sovereignty, for which reason the Government of Guatemala could not consider at this time, or in the future, the possibility of making this case matter for international discussion." The Government of the United States does not controvert in the slightest the proposition that the Act of Congress of the Republic of Guatemala, Decree 900, known as the Agrarian Reform Law, constitutes an act of sovereignty inherent in Guatemala. Every act of the Guatemalan Government constitutes a sovereign act, as do the acts of every other sovereign Government, including the acts of the Government of the United States. But to state that no sovereign act of a Government effecting foreign states or their nationals is open to discussion, or question, as to its validity under international law, because it is a sovereign act, is to say that states are not subject to international law. One has only to look at the diplomatic records of any Government over any period of time to see that such sovereign acts are constantly discussed and held up to scrutiny by other members of the family of nations with whom they treat for determination as to whether they measure up to or fall below the standards required under international law.

Doubtless, it will be recalled that in the case of P. W. Shufeldt, an American national, whose claim against Guatemala was settled by international arbitration,

Guatemala was held responsible for damages resulting from a legislative act (Decree No. 1544, of May 22, 1928). Interestingly, in that case Guatemala contended, *inter alia*, that the decree was in the national interest and within the legislative attributes. As to these contentions, the Arbitrator held (in his decision of July 24, 1930, awarding \$236,403.59 plus interest in favor of the claimant) that:

"it is perfectly competent for the Government of Guatemala to enact any decree they like and for any reasons they see fit and such reasons are no concern of this Tribunal. But this Tribunal is only concerned where such a decree, passed even on the best of grounds, works injustice to an alien subject, in which case the Government ought to make compensation for the injury inflicted and cannot invoke any municipal law to justify their refusal to do so."

And at another point in the same decision it was held:

"The Guatemalan Government contend further that the decree of the 22nd May 1928 was the constitutional act of a Sovereign State exercised by the National Assembly in due form according to the Constitution of the Republic and that such decree has the form and power of law and is not subject to review by any judicial authority. This may be quite true from a national point of view but not from an international point of view for 'it is a settled principle of international law that a sovereign can not be permitted to set up one of his own municipal laws as a bar to a claim by a foreign sovereign for a wrong done to the latter's subject.'"

The Government of the United States is not disposed to comment upon the "policy of the Government of Guatemala in this matter—[that is to say:] effectiveness of the social function of property, increase in production, and raising of the people's standard of living", which it is stated in the Memorandum coincides with the stated policy of the United Nations as recited in General Assembly Resolution 636 (VII) of December 21, 1952, Seventh Session. Attention of the Guatemalan Government is called, however, to the fact that nothing contained in the Resolution referred to, authorized or purported to authorize states in the exercise of their sovereignty in developing their natural wealth and resources, to violate rights of other states or their nationals under international law. The Resolution referred to clearly recommends that consideration be given by member States to "the need for maintaining the flow of capital in conditions of security, mutual confidence and economic cooperation among nations" in the exercise of the right freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources. As is well known, the undermining of confidence on the part of foreign investors is a direct result of Guatemala's expropriation of foreign-owned property; the Resolution warned that this would be the result.

The Government of the United States is indeed pleased to learn from the Memorandum that the Government of Guatemala "offers the full guarantee and protection of the law to foreign investment companies which operate or desire to operate in the territory [of Guatemala]". However, the guarantee of the protection of Guatemalan law is not enough. The Government of Guatemala is also bound to give the full guarantee and protection of the law of nations to foreign investment companies which operate in the territory of Guatemala. When states in the exercise of their sovereign prerogatives determine as a matter of policy to nationalize the property of foreign states or their nationals, they are under the obligation to pay just compensation for such property.

Thus, in a case where shipbuilding contracts and materials, including ships under construction, the property of Norwegian nationals, were requisitioned by the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation pursuant to a general order of August 3, 1917, and the claim of Norway against the United States was subsequently submitted under an agreement of June 30, 1921, to the arbitration

of a Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the Tribunal held that:

"Whether the action of the United States was lawful or not, just compensation is due to the claimants under the municipal law of the United States, as well as under the international law, based upon the respect for private property."

Just compensation may be defined as that compensation which, as indicated in the previous Aide-Memoire of the United States on the present subject, is "prompt", is "adequate", and is "effective"—otherwise the payment is not "just".

Payment in bonds maturing in 25 years, with interest at 3 percent per annum, and of uncertain market value is scarcely to be regarded as either prompt or effective payment. Many of the holders will realize little on the bonds in the course of their lives.

The offer of payment in bonds under all the circumstances is not of a nature to offer "the full guarantee and protection" of either Guatemala or of the law of nations.

Moreover, the fixing of the amount of the bonds on the basis of tax value of the properties, especially in the light of tax-evaluation procedures followed in the instant case by the Guatemalan authorities, bears not the slightest resemblance to just evaluation. The Government of Guatemala in assuming that the *Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala* bound itself to the tax-assessed valuation of the land, has adopted a position not at all in accord with the facts as understood by the Government of the United States.

The expropriated lands were purchased from 1928 to 1930. At the time of purchase, the properties were undeveloped and were assessed according to declarations made by the Company's predecessors in title in 1921 under Decree 1153 of that year. Although the law authorized the Government to rectify the tax values every five years, nothing had been done since 1921 to raise these values. In 1935 the Government of Guatemala itself fixed the tax values of the Company's properties under the authority contained in a Resolution of January 30, 1930, under which the Minister of Finance issued regulations creating a Commission to carry out a revaluation throughout the country and a Resolution of July 24, 1931, which gave landowners until August 20 to file declarations and provided that in case no declaration was filed the tax value would be that fixed by the Commission. No declaration having been filed by the Company, the Government itself fixed the tax values in 1935. At that time the Company was just starting its development and had not constructed the railways, roads, irrigation systems, sanitation, and other works that greatly increased the value of the land. On May 30, 1945, the Government issued a Resolution providing for another rectification of tax values. In this Resolution it was recited that the Government had not taken any measures to increase tax valuations since the Resolution of July 24, 1931. The Resolution of May 30, 1945, gave the landowners six months within which to file declarations of revised values, and this period was extended from time to time until November 30, 1948. On September 23, 1948, the *Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala* presented its declaration in accordance with law and received a receipt therefor. On April 22, 1949, the tax officials of the Government being unable to find the declaration presented by the Company, duplicate declarations were filed with the National Tax Office. This declaration of the Company, after excluding many items from the declaration in accordance with the terms of the contract between the Company and the Government, fixed the tax value of its rural property at a figure many times larger than the previously registered value. The Tax Office then advised the Company that its declaration would be checked in due course but that the revision could be made immediately if the Company would pay the expenses of three appraisers and supply them with the necessary information. On July 1, 1949, the

Company advised the office handling the tax declarations revision that it was willing to pay the expenses of the appraisers and desired to have the appraisal made. On June 2, 1950, almost a year later, the appraisal was ordered as requested by the Company. In May 1951, after repeated requests by the Company, the appraisers were designated and went to the Company's properties for the inspection. The appraisers received the full cooperation of the Company and completed their work in June 1951. Nevertheless, the values declared by the Company were never entered in the tax records nor was the Company advised of the reason this was not done.

On June 19, 1952, the Agrarian Law was enacted with the provision that the basis for fixing values of expropriated properties should be the value registered in the official record of rural property for the land as it stood on May 9, 1952. After the passage of the Agrarian Law on June 19, 1952, and despite the fact that Article 53 of the Constitution of Guatemala provides that administrative acts are public and that citizens have a right to examine them, the attorneys for the *Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala* were not allowed to examine the file containing the declaration of value made by the Company in 1948 and its subsequent handling.

The foregoing resumé of the facts, far from revealing any imputation of a fraudulent evaluation of its property for tax purposes on the part of the Company, reveals that the Company endeavored for almost five years to raise this evaluation, following procedures prescribed by Guatemala toward this end. In the face of this record it is factually incorrect to assume, as does the Memorandum under reference, that the Company is bound by a tax value fixed by the Government itself almost twenty years ago and an evaluation which is far below the market value of the property at the time of its expropriation. There is a tremendous disparity between the value still registered in 1952 for these lands in the tax records and that proposed by the Company in 1948.

Apart from the foregoing recitation of the facts with reference to what seems to have been a studied effort on the part of Guatemalan officials to refrain from changing the tax evaluations in the tax records, it is well known that in many jurisdictions the practice of evaluating land for tax purposes at less than its real or fair value has the sanction of accepted usage. In any case, no imputation of fraud arises when the owner seeks the full value of his land in the case of sale or in the event of expropriation. That tax values in Guatemala are not intended to represent the full commercial value of the land at a given time is indicated by the long periods which elapsed between tax evaluations and the fact that the law provides that the tax value of land will not be increased between evaluations unless the property is sold. This is also indicated by the fact that the general expropriation law of Guatemala (Decree No. 529 of July 9, 1948) allows owners, in the case of partial expropriation of property to recover up to 30 percent in excess of the tax evaluation of the entire property.

In the present case, therefore, the offer of the Government of Guatemala to make payment for properties expropriated on the basis of tax value, and that a tax value which Guatemalan officials themselves initially fixed and maintained on the tax records, in spite of the efforts of the Company to have the tax values rectified, represents a mere gesture, certainly not the payment of the just or fair compensation required by international law.

The obligation of a state imposed by international law to pay just or fair compensation at the time of taking of property of foreigners cannot be abrogated from the international standpoint by local legislation. If the contrary were true, states seeking to avoid the necessity of making payment for property expropriated from foreign nationals could avoid all pecuniary responsibility simply by changing their local law. Every international obligation could thus be wiped off the books. But international law cannot thus be flouted. Membership in the family of nations imposes international obligations.

In thus rejecting the factual and legal soundness of

the Guatemalan Memorandum of June 26, 1953, the Government of the United States desires to make clear that the transparent excuses made for the proffered treatment of American property rights in Guatemala—the exercise of sovereign rights by Guatemala, nondiscrimination as between nationals and aliens, payment of a deliberately maintained tax value—are not tantamount to the payment of just compensation, to reasonable evaluation, or to fair treatment. Such compensation as that proposed by Guatemala in the present case, is anything but encouraging to American investors and American enterprise in Guatemala.

The United States seeks only that which is just—that which is reasonable—that which is fair—for American investors in Guatemala.

The Government of the United States has long demonstrated by concrete acts its support of programs improving the economic conditions of its neighbors. It supports agrarian development, but sees no shred of justification in agrarian legislation sanctioning the seizure of property of American citizens in Guatemala contrary to international norms. Violation of the basic norms of justice cannot fail to undermine mutual confidence without which economic progress is retarded.

The United States previously raised the question of compensation in the hope that a settlement might be arrived at before presenting, on behalf of the American owners of *Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala*, a formal claim for compensation as required to be paid under international law. Through amicable negotiations, the United States seeks to protect her nationals and their property rights.

The Department of State adheres to the hope that the Government of Guatemala will perceive the desirability of exploring these matters carefully and with all possible wisdom, bearing in mind that the United States can only expect that the Government of Guatemala, as a sovereign State and as a member of the family of nations, will conduct its affairs with justness, with reasonableness and with fairness. It is to be hoped that the two Governments shall achieve such a formula for the settlement of the present matter.

President To Attend Dedication of Falcon Dam

White House press release dated August 25

The White House announced on August 25 that President Eisenhower will meet with President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines of Mexico on October 19, 1953, to dedicate the Falcon Dam on the Rio Grande, approximately 75 miles downstream from Laredo, Tex.

The dam, which will serve the Lower Rio Grande Valley, was constructed jointly by the United States and Mexico under the supervision of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, in accordance with terms of the Water Treaty of 1944. It is an outstanding example of practical cooperation by two neighboring countries in the utilization of a common resource. The installation will create a reservoir having a maximum surface area of 113,000 acres, and includes power plants on each side of the river capable of generating 31,500 kw. each. It is 26,294 feet long and rises 150 feet above the stream bed.

Composition of the Korean Political Conference

*Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

COMMITTEE I STATEMENT OF AUGUST 25

I shall be very brief and I shall first of all make a few observations on the speech of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union and then make a few observations on the speech of the distinguished representative of India.

The representative of the Soviet Union [Andrei Vyshinsky] said that he had been unable to find statements by General Nam Il which substantiated my contention that the language of the armistice agreement met General Nam Il's wishes and desires. I would like briefly to read an excerpt from the official transcript of proceedings dated February 19, 1952, statement by General Nam Il:

The draft of the principles submitted by our side on the fifth item of the agenda is very clear in itself. There can be no misunderstanding whatever. By the governments of the countries concerned on both sides in our draft principle is naturally meant the governments of the countries concerned on the part of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers and the governments of the countries concerned on the side of the Unified Command.

I want to read one more excerpt from General Nam Il on February 10:

Next, your proposal employs the term "U.N.," but, as everybody knows, not all members of the U.N. have sent troops to Korea to take part in the war. On the contrary, a considerable number of nations are opposed to sending troops to Korea and a considerable number of nations have not sent any troops. Therefore, it is not appropriate to nominate the U.N. as a whole. On the other hand, the wording "governments of the countries concerned of the U.N." in our proposal conforms precisely to the obtaining circumstances. We see no reason for adopting the simple term U.N.

I am glad to call that to the attention of the representative of the Soviet Union because he said he could not find it.

I am not a lawyer, but I can agree with him that one of the marks of a good lawyer is that he goes to the real meaning and follows the maxim that the spirit giveth life. Certainly there is one thing

that is clear from the spirit of all these proceedings and that is by the phrase "governments concerned on both sides" both of the negotiators of the armistice agreement meant the nations which had put their troops under the Unified Command, and certainly it is clear that they did not mean that nations like the Soviet Union, which had aided and abetted the aggressors, should be considered as eligible for membership on our side or for membership as a neutral.

We have heard a good deal about people glaring at each other across the table. Mr. Chairman, I think people can glare at each other across the table, they can glare at each other at a long table or at a table which is in the shape of a pentagon, or a hexagon, or an octagon. We have even glared

Discussion of Time and Place of Korean Political Conference

Press release 470 dated September 1

Representatives of the 16 U. N. countries with armed forces in Korea and representatives of the Republic of Korea met on September 2 at the State Department in compliance with the U. N. Resolution concerning the Korean Political Conference.¹ At the conclusion of the meeting, the following statement was made by Secretary Dulles in behalf of the participants:

"The Governments represented on the side contributing armed forces under the Unified Command in Korea met together and exchanged views in regard to the time and place of the conference. There was a full discussion and a general identity of approach in regard to the time and possible sites for the conference which would be most conducive to its success. The group agreed unanimously that pursuant to the General Assembly resolution the United States should, in the light of the discussions at this meeting, communicate with the other side and seek to make concrete arrangements for a time and place. It was also agreed that the group would meet again as appropriate following an exchange of views with the other side."

¹ U. N. doc. A/Resolution/102 (A); for text, see p. 366.

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) and in plenary session, and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N.

at each other here sometimes sitting at a horse-shoe table. I do not think the question of glaring has anything to do with the shape of the table.

I would also like to call attention to the fact, without going into the whole ancient history of this affair, that the United Nations Commission on Korea established conclusively and 53 members of the U.N. recognized the fact that it was North Korea which committed the aggression in June 1950 and the Assembly again found this fact to be so in February 1951.

The representative of the Soviet Union and some other speakers today and in preceding sessions have objected that such a small nation as the Republic of Korea is in a position of unduly great influence, so they say, as regards the proposed conference. Needless to say, the United States is by no means agreed with the Republic of Korea on all points, but we would make this observation. There are here in this room statesmen from many small countries. It was not so long ago as history goes that the United States was a small country and we still have somewhat of the spirit of a small country. Let me ask the representatives of small nations whether it is not fair and just that a small nation which has had a war fought on its soil, which has contributed more than half of the combat troops, should have a large voice concerning a conference which is to deal with that small country's future? If such a small country did not have a large voice, there would indeed be grave injustice. It would be everlastingly wrong if we endorsed the proposition that those who fight the battle should be brushed aside at the peace.

I would like to address myself now in conclusion to the words of my distinguished friend from India [V. K. Krishna Menon], and I underscore and emphasize everything that he says about our cordial personal relations. On the resolution introduced by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, recommending that the Government of India participate in the political conference,² let me say that the U.S. intends to vote against this resolution for the following reasons.

1. Our chief and indeed our only purpose is to insure the success of the conference. We believe that the conference is most likely to succeed if it is limited to the belligerents on both sides, as the armistice agreement contemplated and as both sides in effect agreed when they adopted paragraph 60. It is not therefore India that we oppose. We would not favor the inclusion of any nonbelligerent state. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we consider that they belong on the side of the aggressors.

2. A principal participant, if not the principal participant, on our side is the Republic of Korea,

² U.N. doc. A/L. 153. In the vote on Aug. 27, Committee I approved the resolution 27-21 (U.S.)-11, with India not participating.

the victim of the aggression, and the only legal government in Korea. Obviously, their views are most important and their agreement is indispensable to any results of the political conference. In view of the known attitude of the Republic of Korea, we believe the participation of India would jeopardize the success of the conference.

3. There are other Governments with more direct interest in Korea than India; for example, Japan and the National Government of China. We have not favored their inclusion on a conference on Korea and we do not favor such inclusion now. But the inclusion of India or any other nonbelligerent would make the claim of these governments to participation virtually undeniable.

These are the chief reasons, Mr. Chairman. Let me emphasize again that we would not be voting against India as such. The factors which motivate us in no way reflect on India. I agree with Mr. Menon that there is no need for heat. In fact, the Government and the people of the United States have the greatest admiration for India, whom we regard as a great democratic power with direct interests in the Far East and which can play a great role in efforts to assure peace and democracy in Asia. We have worked with India in the past. We will do so again and probably very soon. The Korean conference which is our immediate concern and the attitude which the Communists reveal there will determine in large measure when it would be useful to discuss other problems affecting the peace of the Far East and of Asia. I would like to say to the distinguished representative from India and to underscore it with all the emphasis at my command that in any such later discussions or conference on Far Eastern problems generally, India should play a central and a constructive role, and we, the United States, would do all in our power to facilitate her participation.

COMMITTEE I STATEMENT OF AUGUST 26

We have given the resolution submitted by India, Burma, Indonesia, and Liberia³ the most careful and sympathetic consideration, as any resolution by governments devoted to peace and to the principles of the charter deserves. At first reading, there appeared to us to be no reason for this or any other resolution informing the Communists of what we are doing here. After all, all that we are doing here is to consider what the United Nations thinks of the armistice, and that speaks for itself. But in deference to the views of the four Governments sponsoring the resolution, we are prepared to go along with its general purpose. Since paragraph 60 of the armistice agreement is but a recommendation, it could do no

³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.50 (approved on Aug. 27 by a vote of 54 (U.S.)-4-2).

harm to have the Communists formally informed of political decisions taken pursuant to these military recommendations. The Communists would thus be informed that the General Assembly approves the armistice, that it welcomes the political conference recommended by paragraph 60, and that the General Assembly has made a number of recommendations concerning the conference directed particularly to our side, the side consisting of those governments which have contributed to the United Nations action in Korea.

We are therefore prepared to support the bulk of the four-power resolution. We do not however agree with the possible implications of the final clause of the resolution, "and to report to the General Assembly as appropriate". We do not concede, for example, that the Communists legitimately have anything to say on the resolutions which we are here about to adopt. The United Nations is not telling the Communists what arrangements they should make for their side. They certainly have no right to tell us what to do for our side. The Communists' views on time and place will be sought as provided in the 15-power resolution,⁴ and of course their views on substance they will be able to express at the political conference itself.

We cannot agree in particular with the implication of the proposal before us that the Communist reactions might probably be the basis for further consideration by the General Assembly. Such a position would not only in our view be entirely out of order but would hold up the convocation of the conference. It would get us into lengthy wrangles which might prevent the conference from being held within the period contemplated by paragraph 60 and which would reduce the likelihood of the success of the conference. This could be fatal to our hopes for peace. Time is vital. We should move as speedily as possible, taking prompt advantage of the common action which resulted in the armistice agreement.

Mr. Menon has said, in effect, that these objectionable implications are not intended by the resolution. If so, I hope he will not object to an amendment which will bring the language in line with his intention. Mr. Belaúnde of Peru has proposed such an amendment. The United States will vote for the Peruvian substitution for the final phrase of this resolution. We will vote for the four-power resolution as modified by the Peruvian amendment.⁵

I desire to comment now on the Soviet resolution⁶ and the Soviet amendments which have been coming along this morning. We have watched

with interest the various changes and corrections in the Soviet resolution since it was first introduced, and have listened carefully to the explanation of them by the Soviet representative. I am not always sure that I can follow him, but so far as I can I am forced to conclude that, as the French say, "*Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*" Our fundamental disagreement with the spirit and purpose of the resolution has been made abundantly plain in the various statements which I have made in this Committee. It certainly is not necessary to argue any more about the shape of the table. But several things stand out about the Soviet resolution.

First, the representative of the Soviet Union would exclude from the conference the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Turkey, Thailand, and the Union of South Africa, whose sons have fought for the cause of the United Nations in Korea. That is the first fact.

The second fact: The representative of the Soviet Union told us yesterday at great length about the importance of including Korea's neighbors. One does not have to be an expert on geography to know that Poland and Czechoslovakia, and our good and valued neighbors to the south, Mexico, are not exactly geographically contiguous to Korea. And it is accurate to say that countries like India, Indonesia, Burma, Syria and Egypt, all countries for which we have the highest regard, are also not exactly next-door neighbors. On the other hand, there is no mention of Japan, which is a neighbor, nor of the National Government of China, which for my Government and most of the Governments in this Assembly and for the United Nations itself is the true government of China, nor the Philippines, whose claim to attend the conference rests not only on the fact that she placed troops under the Unified Command but on proximity as well. In fact, on this double basis, Thailand has an irrefutably superior claim to any of those nations previously mentioned.

Third, several speakers have already noted in regard to the earlier draft of the Soviet proposal that it would give a veto to the Chinese Communists and North Koreans but not to the Republic of Korea. Yesterday, the representative of the Soviet Union said that this was a falsification of his position and consequently we might have expected to see this point made clear in the revision which was introduced yesterday afternoon. As I read it, however, the point made by these delegations is still valid. The latest draft of the Soviet resolution provides, "that the decisions of the conference will be deemed to have been adopted if they have the unanimous consent of both parties which have signed the armistice agreement." Now, the only signatories of the armistice agreement were the Unified Command and the commanders of the North Korean and Chinese Com-

⁴ U.N. doc. A/L.151/Rev. 1; for text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 31, 1953, p. 287. On Aug. 27 Committee I approved the 15-power resolution by a vote of 42-5 (Soviet bloc)-12.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.51. The amendment was withdrawn during the debate preceding the vote.

⁶ U. N. doc. A/C.1/L. 48/Rev. 1 (rejected on Aug. 27 by a vote of 5-41-13).

munist forces. Despite the obscurities of the Soviet Union representative yesterday, therefore, the resolution would seem still to provide that a solution for Korea could be imposed against its will on the Republic of Korea, the only legal government of Korea and the government of the country which has made such enormous sacrifices to repel aggression.

Mr. Chairman, it is not necessary to labor these points. Needless to say, the Soviet resolution is unacceptable in its intention, in its letter and in its spirit. The United States will vote against it. The so-called Soviet amendment to the 15-power resolution is exactly the same as the Soviet resolution and is but another device for confusing the procedures and getting theirs to an early vote. We shall, of course, vote against that, too, and to the more recently proposed Soviet amendments which all have the similar purpose.

COMMITTEE I STATEMENT OF AUGUST 27

I had not intended to speak again, but in view of what the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union said yesterday in reference to the United States, I would like a brief word of reply.

His thinly veiled threat that the Communist side might not attend the conference unless they can also have a voice in who makes up the anti-Communist side is a perfect example of the kind of attitude which, if it is persisted in, will make peace impossible. We on the free world side are making an honest, practical, and good-faith attempt to get ready for a conference. Undoubtedly our proposal is not perfect—nothing human is perfect—but no one here has yet suggested anything better or, in my view, anything as good. If the Communist side does not wish to have peace, there won't be any. It takes two to make peace. If they do not want a conference, they can wreck it. But no filibustering, pettifogging, and hair-splitting on how we of the free world have decided to set up our own side, will fool anyone, and the world will place the responsibility right where it belongs—and I am not pointing to Sir Gladwyn Jebb.

The representative of the Soviet Union was, I thought, especially unfortunate when he spoke of a master race here in America. You gentlemen, you live in New York, you live in the United States, you can look around New York, you can go to Washington, you can go anywhere in America and see for yourselves—in the city halls, in the state capitals, in the national government, in business, in labor, and in the professions. Where is the master race in all these places? Who is it? Look back at the history of the United States. You will find that there were 36 different languages spoken here in New York before the American Revolution. The Americans then had many religions. Some of them, I guess, did not

have any religion. But they all had the religion of liberty in their hearts. Look at the casualty lists in Korea, Mr. Representative of the Soviet Union. Read the names that show descent from all the different races of the globe.

Then look at the authentic reports from behind the Iron Curtain which show the systematic attempt in the Soviet Union to wipe out Christianity, Judaism, and Mohammedanism. Read the reports about the small minority of so-called "great Russians" who are crowding the native peoples in the Soviet Union out of the choice jobs and are trying to take over everything for themselves. Those are real master-race tactics on the Hitler pattern.

Now, I hope the interpreters will be very careful with what I am going to say now and get it just right. To paraphrase an old American saying, the representative of the Soviet Union, when he talked about a master race in America, missed another one of several great opportunities in his life to keep quiet.

STATEMENT MADE IN PLENARY SESSION, AUGUST 28

The resolution confronting us—A/L. 154—was not fully considered in the First Committee and it is therefore incumbent on us who sponsored it to say a few words about it.⁷

This resolution first recalls all the past resolutions dealing with the United Nations action against aggression in Korea. It is important that the story of the United Nations action against aggression be left clear and beyond question, particularly in the face of persistent efforts to rewrite that history.

After noting with profound satisfaction that the fighting in Korea has ceased on the basis of an armistice, the resolution salutes the heroic soldiers of the Republic of Korea and of all United Nations members who fought to resist aggression.

It pays especial tribute to those who laid down their lives in this cause.

Finally it expresses satisfaction that this first effort in human history to repel armed aggression by collective military means under the auspices of a worldwide international organization has been successful.

This resolution is self-explanatory. It has deep meaning for us and for all those whose sons have endured the unspeakable horrors of the Communist prison camps, have returned home shattered in health, and have fallen on the field of battle. We also are certain that the essence of this resolution appeals to all lovers of peace and liberty regardless of whether their nations sent troops to Korea or not.

⁷ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 31, 1953, p. 287. The Assembly adopted the resolution on Aug. 28 by a vote of 53-5 (Soviet bloc)-0, with India not participating.

Sixteen United Nations members contributed forces to the Unified Command. While frankly, we wish that others had done the same, fairness compels me to say here what I have often said to my fellow citizens: that in the case of many governments they simply could not do so.

For one thing, there are member nations represented here whose countries are very small and have few if any forces.

There are others who are compelled to maintain military forces at home or on their own borders because of local threats to peace.

Then there are instances, of some of which I have personal knowledge, of contributions which were offered, but the practical arrangements were not consummated. Naturally we hope that there will be a considerably larger number of nations sending troops for service there under present conditions. Of course, this service will have to be on a rotation basis and in full accord with the armistice agreement provisions.

In all of this, I naturally do not refer to the small minority of nations here who were in active and flagrant sympathy with the aggression.

Let a word also be said for the countries which did not contribute armed forces but made other contributions.

We think of the hospital ship contributed by Denmark and medical units contributed by India, Norway, Sweden—and by Italy which is not yet a member of this organization.

We think of the 43 governments which contributed to the Korean relief program. We remember Burma, Mexico, Thailand, the Philippines and Ecuador, which sent rice; Cuba, Denmark, and Belgium, which sent sugar; and China, the United Kingdom and Greece, which sent salt. Argentina, New Zealand, Pakistan and Viet-Nam sent meat, grain and powdered milk. Peru, Japan, Venezuela and Uruguay sent clothing and blankets. Among the countries sending medical supplies were Austria, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ethiopia, France, Australia and Greece. For the relief effort rubber was sent from Liberia, lumber from Cambodia, cod liver oil from Iceland, citrus fruit from Israel, sisal from Haiti. There are other countries—notably Iran, Turkey and Nicaragua—which offered material contributions which because of the difficulties of transportation, rigors of climate or other difficulties could not be accepted.

When it comes to cash, contributions of more than 18 million dollars were made by 18 countries including Belgium, Canada, Honduras, Indonesia, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, and Monaco. In addition pledges of contributions in cash or kind totaling more than 5 million dollars have been made by Chile, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Panama, Syria, Brazil and Uruguay.

And many of the countries I have named made several contributions of different kinds.

There is one particularly vivid illustration of international cooperation which occurred in 1950 when the appeal for food for Korea went out to the members of the United Nations. Thailand and the Philippines responded immediately with gifts of rice. But, in order to be of any use, the rice had to be transported and it could not be transported without bags. The request to India as a great producer of jute bags brought a prompt response. The rice from Thailand and the Philippines was thus bagged by India and transported to Korea on ships of the United States.

Today marks a significant milestone, not only in the brief history of the United Nations, but in the long search of the human race for peace.

The tragedy of Korea evoked a response from the United Nations which is unique in human history. The aggressors have been thrown back from beyond the line from which aggression began in June 1950. Small nations, as well as larger ones, will find comfort and security in what has been achieved in Korea. The hope of the people of the world that they may not again have to face the scourge of a third world war has been raised. There is more reason to hope and to believe that international questions will, in the future, be settled by peaceful means as the charter requires and not by war.

The Korean tragedy does not engender extravagant optimism about the political conference. But we hope that the other side may be prepared to show some respect for the overwhelming wishes of the people of Korea and the judgment of the people of the world. We hope that they are ready to negotiate, in good faith, a settlement which would leave Korea free and unified, secure against aggression and subversion and able to devote all its energies to the terrible task of rebuilding their war-torn homeland. The Governments who will represent our side at this conference will negotiate in good faith. If the Communists will only do likewise, Korea may yet see the end of its martyrdom, and the Korean people the dawn of a brighter day.

What we did in Korea in a military way was without precedent. What we have done here in New York in the last 10 days in making recommendations for the political conference is equally without precedent. Of course the record, being human, is not perfect and it can be argued that more could have been done and that what was done could have been done with greater speed. But we can be everlastingly proud of what was accomplished. Obviously the United Nations has not developed as its founders planned, but equally obviously it has fully justified its existence.

In the resolution before us we pay tribute to our dead. In so doing we can say to them that we have tried to keep the faith and that, as fallible human beings, we are here today doing the best we can to make a world worthy of their sacrifice.

STATEMENT IN AUGUST 28 PLENARY SESSION*

The statement of the distinguished representative of India that the purposes of peace would best be served by not forcing the resolution concerning Indian participation to a vote in this Assembly is generous and it is statesmanlike. His desire, in his own words, not to add to the heat of battle is the kind of remark that we who know him have come to expect from a man whom we consider to be the great representative of the great leader of a great nation. It is the kind of spirit which gives us hope for the future.

I would like to repeat what we have said many times, that our position on this question was not directed at India as such. On the contrary, we feel deeply that at any later discussions or conferences on Far Eastern problems, India must play a central and constructive role, and that we of the United States of America would do all in our power to facilitate her participation.

Let me say once again how much we appreciate this generous and statesmanlike attitude.

Texts of General Assembly Resolutions on Korea

Following are texts of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on August 28, the final day of the seventh regular session:

U.N. doc. A/Resolution/102
Dated Aug. 31, 1953

A

IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 60 OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

The General Assembly

1. NOTES WITH APPROVAL the Armistice Agreement concluded in Korea on 27 July 1953, the fact that the fighting has ceased, and that a major step has thus been taken toward the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. REAFFIRMS that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

3. NOTES the recommendation contained in the Armistice Agreement that "In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.";

*Made following Mr. Menon's statement that India wished to withdraw as a possible participant in the Political Conference. As a result of the Indian action, no vote was taken in plenary on the draft resolution on Indian participation sponsored by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.K. (U.N. doc. A/L. 153).

4. WELCOMES the holding of such a conference;

5. RECOMMENDS that:

(a) The side contributing armed forces under the Unified Command in Korea shall have as participants in the conference those among the Member States contributing armed forces pursuant to the call of the United Nations which desire to be represented, together with the Republic of Korea. The participating governments shall act independently at the conference with full freedom of action and shall be bound only by decisions or agreements to which they adhere;

(b) The United States Government, after consultation with the other participating countries referred to in subparagraph (a) above, shall arrange with the other side for the political conference to be held as soon as possible, but not later than 28 October 1953, at a place and on a date satisfactory to both sides;

(c) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, if this is agreeable to both sides, provide the political conference with such services and facilities as may be feasible;

(d) The Member States participating pursuant to subparagraph (a) above shall inform the United Nations when agreement is reached at the conference and keep the United Nations informed at other appropriate times;

6. REAFFIRMS its intention to carry out its programme for relief and rehabilitation in Korea, and appeals to the governments of all Member States to contribute to this task.

B

The General Assembly,

HAVING ADOPTED the resolution entitled "Implementation of paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement",

RECOMMENDS that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics participate in the Korean political conference provided the other side desires it.

C

The General Assembly

REQUESTS the Secretary-General to communicate the proposals on the Korean question submitted to the resumed meetings of the seventh session and recommended by the Assembly, together with the records of the relevant proceedings of the General Assembly, to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and to report as appropriate.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Thorsten V. Kalijarvi as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective September 1.

FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointment

The President on September 4 announced the recess appointment of Hugh S. Cumming as Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia, subject to future confirmation by the Senate. He succeeds H. Merle Cochran, who resigned on March 15, 1953.

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*Not printed.

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